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PRIVACY, PRIVILEGE AND THE RIGHT TO
KNOW: DISCLOSURE OF AIDS/HIV
STATUS IN THE PHYSICIANPATIENT RELATIONSHIP
"I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade
it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional
provision."1
The right of privacy, 2 although not expressly mentioned in the
United States Constitution, has been recognized as a fundamental
right 3 by the United States Supreme Court.4 The scope of this
right has been shaped by the Court's evaluation of governmental

1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black
disagreed with the judgment and rationale offered by the Court in holding unconstitutional
a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of birth control. Id.
2 See BLAcKs LAw DIcIoNARY 1195 (6th ed. 1990). Right of Privacy is defined as:
The right to be let alone; the right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity;
and right to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters with which
the public is not necessarily concerned... and such right prevents governmental interference in intimate personal relationships or activities, freedoms of individual to make
fundamental choices involving himself, his family, and his relationship with others.
Id; see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONsTrruTIONAL Lw: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.26-18.30 (1986) (describing evolution of privacy right in Supreme Court
decisions).
3 See BLAcK's LAw DIcTIONARY, supra note 2, at 674. Fundamental rights are:
[tihose rights which have their source, and are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, in
the federal Constitution... Challenged legislation that significantly burdens a "fundamental right" ... will be reviewed under a stricter standard of review. A law will be
held violative of the due process clause if it is not closely tailored to promote a compelling or overriding interest of government.
Id; see also Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 1983) (defining fundamental rights).
4 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (declaring "penumbra of privacy" exists for individuals);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (stating that although Constitution does not explicitly mention it, right of personal privacy exists); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891) (stating right to possession and control over one's own self is fundamental
right). See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTrruTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.26-18.30 (1986) (discussing progression of "right to privacy" in
Supreme Court); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193, 193 (1890) (introducing concept, although in context of tort law, of "right to be let
alone").

805

806

ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 11:805

interferences into personal matters. 5 As the Court began to strike
6
down substantive legislation, it carved out privacy protections.
A current issue in medical science raises once again the question of how far-reaching the veil of privacy will extend. 7 The contemporary challenge confronting privacy rights is the confidentiality laws surrounding the plague of AIDS.' Government must
strike a balance between the infected individual's right to keep his
illness confidential 9 and the overriding public policy concern of
stemming the spread of the virus. 10
5 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (holding that victim of unlawful search and seizure under Fourth Amendment had right to recover property); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622, 630 (1886) (interpreting Fourth and Fifth Amendments
as protecting sanctity of home and privacies of life).
6 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (establishing that family and
procreation involve "basic civil rights of man"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (holding that statute compelling parents to send children to public school
was unreasonable interference with parents' liberty in raising children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (finding statute prohibiting education in language other
than English violated Fourteenth Amendment); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment "requires that the freedom of choice to marry
not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations"). But cf Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
208 (1927) (upholding sterilization statute).
7 See e.g., Ugo Colella, HIVRelated Information and the Tension Between Confidentiality
and Liberal Discovery, 16 J. LEG. MED. 33, 41 (1995) (discussing how growing understanding of AIDS virus impacts disclosure laws); Richard C. Turkington, Confidentiality Policy
for HIV-Related Information: An Analytical Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy
Cases, 34 VmL. L. REV. 871, 880 (1989) (showing how novelty of AIDS and fear it causes
calls for changes in confidentiality laws); Charles D. Weiss, Comment, Aids: Balancing the
Physician'sDuty to Warn and Confidentiality Concerns, 38 EMORY L.J. 279, 287 (1989) (discussing extent of confidentiality requirements for AIDS-status disclosure and growing difficulties in this area).
8 See Gary H. Loeb, Protectingthe Right to InformationalPrivacy for HiV-Positive Prisoners, 27 CoLruM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 269, 317-18 (1994) (asserting HIV status of prisoners
should be kept confidential and disclosure is unconstitutional); Rodger Doughty, Comment,
The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the Resurgance of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82 CALiF. L. REV. 111, 123 (1994)
(discussing AIDS as threat to right to privacy especially for homosexuals); Joseph S. Goode,
Note, Perspectiveson Patient Confidentiality in the Age of AIDS, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 967,
980 (1993) (claiming threat of AIDS hysteria emphasizes importance of maintaining patient's right to privacy). See generally The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First 10 Years, 40
Moasmrry & MORTALITY Wxav. REP. 357, 358 (1991) (noting World Health Organization
has concluded that eight to ten million adults and one million children worldwide are HIV
infected or have AIDS, and by year 2000, forty million people may be infected with HIV or
have AIDS).
9 See e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120980 (West 1996) (prescribes penalty for
unauthorized disclosure of individual's AIDS-status); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, § 305/9
(Smith-Hurd 1995) (AIDS Confidentiality Act); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2782 (McKinney
1996) (AIDS confidentiality statute).
10 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (stating that privacy rights are not violated when medical records are not kept confidential if there is compelling state interest);
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1980) (asserting
that disclosure of medical records for reasons of public health does not automatically infringe on privacy rights); Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990) (declaring
privacy of medical information is not absolute and disclosure of AIDS test results requires
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This Note asserts that an individual's right to privacy must be
considered in relation to the pressing societal demand for public
health and safety. Part One examines the common law development of the right to privacy, with emphasis on the tension between individual rights and public welfare. Part Two focuses on
the nature of privacy in the physician-patient relationship and,
specifically, the rights of individuals with AIDS. Special attention
is paid to situations where ethics might dictate that all HIV-infected persons, especially those engaged in a medical relationship,
disclose their status before seeking or performing invasive medical procedures. Part Three examines New York's treatment of babies born with AIDS and the resulting invasion of the mother's
right to privacy, by analyzing the "AIDS Baby" Bill and Public
Health Law § 2500-f, passed into law in June, 1996, which attempted to address this growing problem. Finally, this Note concludes that legislative action is the sole means of achieving that
which ethical considerations require: full disclosure by all infected
individuals who may put another at risk.
I.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The Post-Civil War Era

The right to privacy, not expressly enumerated in the Constitution but fashioned by the Supreme Court, 1 is somewhat tenuous. 12 The right to privacy, however, has become a recognized
compelling state interest); see also Colella, supra note 7, at 62-63 (discussing need to strike
balance between individuals right to privacy and government's right to intrude for benefit
of public good); Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of the Rationality of Mandatory Testing for
the HIV Antibody: Balancing the Governmental Public Health Interests With the Individual's Privacy Interest, 52 U. PriT. L. REV. 327, 382 (1991) (suggesting mandatory AIDS
testing implicates both public health and personal privacy issues); Jeff Glenney, Note,
AIDS: A Crisis in Confidentiality,62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1701, 1703 (1989) (discussing pros and
cons of limited disclosure of AIDS status allowed by legislation); Marjorie H. Lawyer, Note,
HIV and Dentistry, VAL. U. L. REV. 297, 319-36 (1994) (discussing balancing tests which
determine whether patient's HIV status may be released without patient's consent).
11 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (recognizing that "Constitution does not speak in so many words of the right of privacy....");
see also John N. Suhr, Jr., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: A Clearand
Convincing Call for Comprehensive Legislation to Protect Incompetent Patients'Rights, 40
Am. U. L. REv. 1477, 1519 n.19 (1991) (noting no right of privacy is expressly guaranteed in
Constitution); Brenda S. Thornton, The New InternationalJurisprudenceOn the Right to
Privacy: A Head-On Collision With Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REV. 725, 774 n.15
(1995) (stating no express right to privacy exists in Constitution, but legal recognition of
right has evolved through case law).
12 See generally Richard A. Posner, The UncertainProtection of Privacy by the Supreme
Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 214 ("the objection [to the privacy cases] is ... that they
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right enjoyed by American citizens. 1 3 In general, the Supreme
Court did not even touch upon individual's rights, much less an
express right to privacy, until after the Civil War.14 After the ratification of the Civil War amendments,' 5 the Supreme Court became more concerned with individual rights that protected one's
privacy. 16 The earliest cases that touched on privacy issues did so
in terms of protection from illegal search and seizure.' 7 These
have no basis in any meaningful conception of privacy in any provision of the constitution");
Robert C. Clothier III, Comment, Meeting the Challenge to Privacy Rights By Employees
Drug Testing: The Right ofNondisclosure, 1988 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 213 (describing definition of right to privacy as "uncertain" and "indefinite"); Mark A. Racanelli, Note, Reversals: Privacy and the Rehnquist Court, 81 GEO. L.J. 443, 444 (1992) (describing right to
privacy as uncertain in nature).
13 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (identifying right to privacy for individuals). See generally Dorothy Toth Beasley, Federalismand the Protectionof Individual Rights: The American State ConstitutionalPerspective, 11 G. ST. U. L. REv. 681, 698-99 (1995) (noting 1965
Griswold decision as first Supreme Court decision to recognize Constitutional right to privacy); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (tracing
evolution of right to privacy from 1890 Harvard Law Review Article authored by Warren
and Brandeis to the 1990's).
14 See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 397 (12th ed. 1991). In the time between
the ratification of the Constitution and the Civil War, the Supreme Court had primarily
concerned itself with the structure of the United States government, along with a few other
types of challenges, such as habeas corpus and ex post facto hearings. Id. See generally
LEONARD W.

LEvI, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY

AMERICAN HISTORY 6 (1960) (stating that '[fireedom of speech could not become a civil liberty until.., the people were considered the source of sovereignty, the masters rather than
the servants of the government"). Note that the court never enunciated a specific "right to
privacy" until Griswold. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (declaring right to privacy); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (stating though no specific right to privacy in Constitution,
Griswold specifically enumerated such right).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing due
process and equal protection); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV (granting universal right to vote for
all male citizens).
16 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruledby Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (stating that "security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion" is guaranteed by Civil War amendments); see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 620-21 (1886)
(citing rights under Fourth and Fifth Amendments against unreasonable searches and
seizures); Paul W. Butler & David L. Gregory, A Not So DistantMirror:Federalism and the
Role of Natural Law in the United States, the Republic of Ireland, and the European Community, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 432 (1992) (stating that "the Civil War amendments ... drew the Court into the more unfamiliar terrain of privacy and natural law");
Henry M. Holzer, Texas v. Johnson, 30 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 649,656 (1990) (asserting that
privacy rights were made binding via Civil War amendments); Robert F. Schopp, Education and ContraceptionMake Strange Bedfellows: Brown, Griswold, Lochner, and Putative
Dilemma of Liberalism, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 335, 350-53 (1990) (claiming rationale behind Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896), and majority in
Griswold v. Connecticut were based on similar treatment of individual rights).
17 See, e.g., Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-18 (finding plaintiff was victim of seizure and subsequent forfeiture of his property); see also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925)
(holding seizure of illegal narcotics without warrant in house several blocks from arrest
was inadmissible as incidental to arrest and thus unconstitutional); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 311 (1921) (holding seizure of paper by person following directions of
governmental agent to be unconstitutional); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (holding seizure of papers from corporation without warrant to be
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cases held that although an overriding governmental interest may
exist in support of searches and seizures without warrants, the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments 18 protected an individual from an
"unreasonable search and seizure." 19 Moreover, the Court noted
that this protection extended to the "indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property."20 Almost half a
century later, this fledgling personal right was confirmed in the
landmark case of Olmstead v. United States.2 ' The Court found
that a purpose behind the Fourth and Fifth Amendments was to
violation of constitutional rights); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (holding seizure of papers from defendant's property without warrant to be violation of defendant's constitutional rights); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding same).
is U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... Id.
19 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624. The court held the statute was unconstitutional because it
made the production of a person's private papers compulsory, as compared to other laws
which require production of material evidence, like stolen or forfeited goods, which are not
of a personal nature. Id. at 622-23. The search at issue was found unreasonable, based on
the Court's balancing of the interests of the state against the rights of the individual. Id. at
627; see also Agnello, 269 U.S. at 32-33 (stating that searches of houses require warrants);
Gouled, 255 U.S. at 308-11 (declaring warrants must be lawfully obtained to legally search
houses); Siluerthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 390-92 (holding that information retrieved in
illegal searches cannot be used by searcher); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (stating
warrant must be issued to inspect another's mail).
20 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (noting extent of protection provided by Fourth and Fifth
Amendments); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating Fourth Amendment violation is "the invasion of [one's] indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property") (quoting California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11
(1977) (stating purpose of Fourth Amendment is to prevent government intrusions of "legitimate privacy interests"); Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 491-92 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that with regard to "personal security, personal liberty and private
property," Fourth and Fifth Amendments essentially merge); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (claiming Fourth Amendment creates privacy right "no less important
than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people") (quoting Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)).
21 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Olinstead, the plaintiffs were found guilty of violating the National Prohibition Act, implicated
mostly through recorded conversations the government had acquired by a possibly illegal
wiretap. Id. at 455-56. The Court questioned whether this was actually an illegal search
and seizure as defined by common law, and examined the cases discussed supra note 5, but
nonetheless concluded that a balancing test should apply here. Id. at 458-65. See generally
William J. Stuntz, Privacy'sProblem and the Law of CriminalProcedure,93 MIcH. L. REV.
1016, 1030-36 (1995) (discussing role of Fourth and Fifth amendments in development of
right to privacy); Daniel E. Will, Note, "DearDiary - Can You Be Used Against Me?": The
Fifth Amendment and Diaries,35 B.C. L. REv. 965, 970 (1994) (discussing how protection of
privacy springs from the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as described in Boyd).
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preserve an individual's right "to be let alone"22 without jeopardizing a potentially superior state interest.2"
In addition to privacy protections found under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, the Court has determined that the Fourteenth
Amendment can also be interpreted to protect individual zones of
privacy. 24 In a series of significant cases 25 , the Court expanded the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty protection to the
practice of one's profession,26 the right to bear children,2 7 the rear22 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 634 (1834) (stating "the defendant asks nothing
- wants nothing, but to be let alone until it can be shown that he has violated the rights of
another").
23 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 468. The Court did not deem the interception of telephone calls
in this manner a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but rather decided in favor of the
governmental interest in furthering the purposes behind Prohibition. Id. But see Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated that "a principle to be
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth". Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). It is significant to note that three
justices dissented in this case, claiming that the majority interpreted the Amendments too
strictly, and that this was an example where the individual should be protected. Id. at 471,
485, 488.
24 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in pertinent
part, that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law..." Id; see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398, 434 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (declaring right to privacy is "grounded" in Fourteenth Amendment); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 (1979) (stating Fourteenth
Amendment secures privacy rights) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Roe, 410 U.S.
at 153 (finding right of privacy founded in Fourteenth Amendment); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972) (citing Fourteenth Amendment as major source of the personal
right to privacy); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954) (stating Fourteenth Amendment secures privacy rights); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating privacy
rights exist in first section of Fourteenth Amendment); Gormley, supra note 13, at 1340
(describing Fourteenth Amendment as creator of "fundamental-decision privacy"); John C.
Barker, Note, ConstitutionalPrivacy Rights in the Private Workplace, Under the Federal
and California Constitutions, 19 HASTNGs CONST. L.Q. 1107, 1110-16 (1992) (discussing
important role Fourteenth Amendments plays in right to privacy springing from fundamental fairness guarantee of Due Process).
25 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (creating right to freely associate);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (creating right to bear
children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533 (1925) (creating right to raise one's
children without unnecessary interference); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 391 (1923)
(creating right to practice one's profession).
26 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. The plaintiff, a German language professor, was arrested
for violating a Nebraska statute which proscribed teaching any language other than English to any child who had not passed the eighth grade. Id. at 396-97. The Court recognized
that there is a certain liberty of person created by the Fourteenth Amendment which overlaps with the state's police power to regulate for the public interest. Id. at 399-400.
27 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. The Court held that an Oklahoma statute requiring
sterilization of only certain classes of repeatedly convicted felons was unconstitutional. Id.
at 536-41. The Court decided the case on equal protection grounds under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the statute did not apply to all felons. Id. at 541. The Court commented that procreation was a fundamental individual right with which the government
should not tamper. Id. at 541. But see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (permitting
governmental interference in child-rearing by sterilization of mentally retarded women).
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ing of children, 28 and the right to freely associate. 29 The most sig-

nificant aspect of the Court's rationale in each of these cases is its
adherence to the balancing test developed in earlier cases. 30 The
balancing test requires the Court to weigh the state's need to protect the general welfare through its police power against an
individual's right to prevent unnecessary governmental interference.3 1 The Court has recognized that an individual
should be protected from the state's use of "arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference" in personal matters.3 2 Only

28 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. The challenged Oregon statute penalized parents or
guardians in the state who refused to send their children to public school. Id. at 530. The
plaintiff was a private school with religious affiliations, whose students were forced to withdraw pursuant to the statute. Id. at 532. The Court held that "the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control" arises
from the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 534-35.
29 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. The NAACP was brought into state court for causing irreparable injury to the citizens of Alabama, and consequentially Alabama requested a list of all
NAACP members. Id. at 451. The NAACP refused to release the list, claiming that the
state was abusing its power when it compelled disclosure of the membership lists. Id. at
452. Past disclosure of members had occasioned economic reprisal, loss of employment,
threat of physical coercion and other hostile acts by the public against the members. Id. at
452-62. While the court acknowledged that the state had not directly infringed on any one
particular constitutional right, its request hindered a citizen's right to freely associate,
given the racially charged atmosphere of Alabama. Id. at 462-63. But see New York ex rel.
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 75-76 (1928). This case held that the request for, and
granting of, a list of members of the Ku Klux Klan was constitutional because prevention of
dangerous, violent and illegal acts by KKK was a sufficient state interest to overcome individual members' rights. Id. at 76.
30 Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 458 (1928) (using balancing test of
federal police power against individual's right against unreasonable search and seizure),
and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (describing balancing test of state
interest with individual rights), with NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1958) (balancing state police power against individual's right to privacy) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (balancing rights of personal freedoms to be let alone against governmental interference); see also Stephen A. Stobbs, The Illinois ParentageAct: Constitutional?, 15 N. ILL. U. L. Rlv. 63, 71 (1994) (recognizing importance of balancing test as
applied by Court in Meyer and Skinner).
31 See, e.g., Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. The Meyer court stated:
[The Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.
Id. (citations omitted).
32 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925); see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating "[mlarriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race ....Any experiment which the State conducts
[creates an] irreparable injury... [by] forever depriving [the sterilized criminal] of a basic
liberty").
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when an overriding state interest exists can this right be infringed.

B.

33

The Genesis of the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: Griswold
v. Connecticut

The Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence culminated in the
seminal case of Griswold v. Connecticut,3 4 when the Court expressly announced the existence of the right to privacy. 3 5 The
Supreme Court considered a Connecticut statute which prohibited
the use of contraception by married couples. 36 The Court declared

that the law violated the right to privacy, as gleaned from the Bill
of Rights and from common law. 37 The Griswold Court relied pri-

marily on the First Amendment as the source of the right to pri33 See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461-62. The court said, "This Court has recognized the vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations... the crucial
factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial
exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action takes hold."
Id. at 462-63. For further discussion of the development of the right to privacy through the
balancing tests described in Meyer, Pierce, Skinner, and NAACP, see generally G. Sidney
Buchanan, The Right of Privacy, PastPresent, and Future, 16 OmIo N.U. L. REv. 403, 415,
485 (1989) (discussing Meyer, Pierce, and Skinner's right to privacy as right of freedom
from unreasonable governmental intrusion but there are relevant state interests to be balanced against this individual right) and Gormley, supra note 13, at 1394 (discussing these
cases as creating right to privacy and balancing test).
34 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
35 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (proclaiming individuals have
right to privacy). See generally Annemarie Brennan, Is All Privacy Created Equal?, 20 VT.
L. REV. 815, 820-22 (1996) (describing Griswold decision and dissent); Buchanan, supra
note 33, at 421 (discussing Griswold as first stating right to privacy); Janet L. Dolgin, The
Family in Transition:From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1535
(1994) (naming Griswold as case where Supreme Court first enumerated right to privacy).
36 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. The petitioner in this case was a doctor who prescribed
contraception for a married couple. Id. Both the doctor and the couple were charged with
violating a Connecticut statute which prohibited the prescription, and subsequent use of
contraceptives. Id. Petitioner claimed that these statues violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 481; see also Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIo
N.U. L. REV. 511, 513 (1989) (describing right to privacy as defined in Griswold as springing from First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments); David Helscher,
Griswold v. Connecticutand the Unenumerated Right of Privacy, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 33,
35 (1994) (describing Griswold decision as protecting liberty interests springing from specific sections of Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment).
37 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. The court exclaimed, "[wiould we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of contraceptives? The
very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Id.;
Bloom, supra note 36, at 532 (explaining Griswold decision started emphasis on maintaining individual's privacy in things intimate); Helscher, supra note 36, at 46 (describing how
right to privacy preserves human dignity resting in maintaining privacy in intimate affairs). See generally William M. Beany, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Supreme
Court, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 212, 214 (predicting advent of Court's creation of right to privacy); Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 216, 220 (1960)
(describing potential of definitive right to privacy).

1996]

PRIVACY, PRIVILEGE AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW

vacy, but found that the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth
amendments also played a role.38 The Court acknowledged an extension of the state's police power to invade the marital bedroom
was unjustified when balanced against an individual's interest in
protecting this "sacred" area of privacy. 9 In subsequent years, the
Court applied this balancing test when considering the right to
marry freely 4° and the right of privacy for unmarried people in the
use of contraceptives. 4 '
Roe v. Wade and its Progeny
Roe v. Wade 42 cemented the right to privacy. 43 The plaintiff, a
pregnant single woman, questioned the constitutionality of a
Texas statute which criminalized abortion, claiming that the statC.

38 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-84. Significantly, the Court cited Piercev. Society of Sisters,
Meyer v. Nebraska, and NAACP v. Alabama as cases which were instrumental in defining
the right to privacy. Id. at 482-83. The Court also discussed the Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments as other constitutional provisions that may be tied to the First Amendment to demonstrate this right to privacy. Id. at 484-85. For a later discussion of the right
to privacy as it pertains to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in a search and seizure context, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (holding individual may possess reasonable
expectation of privacy) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (holding
reasonable expectation of privacy exists for individual); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960) (limiting constitutional protection to unreasonable searches and seizures);
see also Bloom, supra note 36, at 513 (discussing importance of various constitutional
amendments to privacy right as defined in Griswold); Helscher, supra note 36, at 36 (discussing Griswold holding of Fourteenth Amendment's importance in right to privacy).
39 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). But see id. at 527 (Stewart and
Black, JJ., dissenting) (labeling statute "uncommonly silly law," but finding no grounds to
hold it unconstitutional).
40 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1967). The petitioner contended that a state
statute prohibiting interracial marriages violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2. The Court noted that regulation of marriage was exclusively within the state's control but still subject to constitutional guidelines.
Id. at 7. Since no overriding state interest would overcome this constitutional protection,
the Virginia statute in Loving was found unconstitutional, and the right to marry was a
freedom recognized as inviolable for all Americans. Id. at 10-11; see also Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (holding marriage under exclusive state control); Naim v. Naim,
87 S.E.2d 749, 755 (1955) (holding control over marital affairs is proper governmental
objective).
41 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972). The petitioner asserted that a state
statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, unless by a
doctor or pharmacist, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court rejected the
state's goal in enacting the statute of discouraging premarital sex. Id. at 448. The Court
concluded that the right to privacy recognized in Griswold belonged to the individual, regardless of marital status. Id. at 438-39.
42 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43 See Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and "Liberty":Their OriginalMeaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate Over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REv.
585, 680 (1994) (discussing Roe and Griswold as source of modern privacy rights); Gary R.
Clouse, Comment, The ConstitutionalRight to Withhold PrivateInformation, 77 Nw. U. L.
REv. 536, 539 (1982) (citing Roe as next significant privacy case after Griswold); David J.
Zampa, Note, The Supreme Court's Abortion Jurisprudence:Will the Supreme Court Pass
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ute violated her right to privacy as guaranteed under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 4 The Court,
after examining the historical background surrounding abortion
46
laws 45 and the state interest behind the Texas abortion statute,
decided that the constitutional right to privacy was broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. 4 7 The Court noted, however, that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulating abortions. 48 Essentially, the Court again applied the important balancing test developed nearly 100 years
before.4 9
In Planned Parenthoodof Missouri v. Danforth50 the Court revisited the scope of privacy in the context of abortion. 5 Several
the "Albatross"Backto the States?, 65 NoTaE DAME L. REv. 731, 742 (1990) (discussing how
Griswold engendered Roe, and how these cases are key to development of right to privacy).
44 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1973). There were two other plaintiffs in this case,
a physician who was suing on behalf of his patients, as well as a young couple who did not
want to have children, and were suing for the right to get an abortion if the couple eventually become pregnant. Id. at 124-28. The court deemed that, aside from Roe, neither party
had standing. Id.
45 Id. at 128-45. The court discussed the Ancient Hippocratic Oath of Rome, British
criminal statutes, and the present day Uniform Abortion Act written by the American Bar
Association in 1972. Id. See Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past:Pre-Roe Abortion
Law in Action, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 309, 312 (1994) (discussing evolution and history of
laws regulating abortion); Amy Johnson, Abortion, Personhood, and Privacy in Texas, 68
TEx. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (1990) (discussing history of abortion as dating from 2696 B.C.);
Peggy S. McClard, Comment, The Freedom of Choice Act: Will the ConstitutionAllow It?, 30
Hous. L. REv. 2041, 2044 (1994) (describing briefly genesis of abortion in America's
history).
46 Roe, 410 U.S. at 147-50. The Texas abortion statute was drafted to discourage illicit
sexual conduct, minimize the hazards of obtaining and performing an abortion, and foster a
state interest in protecting prenatal life. Id.
47 Id. at 153.
48 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. The Court stated, "At some point in pregnancy, these [state]
interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation.... The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute." Id.; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
186 (1973). This case, decided the same day as Roe, re-emphasized the importance of the
balancing test when assessing the right to privacy in the abortion context. Id.
49 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 458-65 (1928) (applying balancing
test in illegal wiretap case); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (applying balancing test in case testing right to educate privately); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399-400 (1923) (applying balancing test to right to privately practice one's profession);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1890) (acknowledging that individual's rights
are subject to reasonable governmental regulations that are necessary to protect public);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886) (balancing interests of state against rights
of individual in search and seizure context).
50 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
51 See Danforth,428 U.S. at 60-61 (discussing abortion rights); see also Andrea M. Sharrin, PotentialFathersand Abortion:A Woman's Womb is Not a Man's Castle, 55 BRooy. L.
REV. 1359, 1371, 1388 (1990) (stating Danforth Court specifically ruled on validity of
spousal consent in abortion rights as balancing test); Maria F. Walters, Who Decides? The
Next Abortion Issue: A Discussion of Fathers'Rights, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 165, 173 (1988)
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physicians who performed abortions challenged a state law which
severely restricted the new-found right to have an abortion. 52 The
Court indicated that privacy rights recognized in Roe should be
tempered by the duty to protect potential human life. 53 Conse-

quently, an important factor in the Court's analysis of the constitutionality of the statute was the balancing of the privacy rights of
the mother "against important state interests in regulation."54
The Supreme Court reapplied the balancing test in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,55 strengthening the state's police power to
regulate abortions. 56 In Casey, the Court increased state power to
regulate abortions when the fetus is viable, stating that at viability, "the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate"
over the mother's right to an abortion.57 The standard of review
the legislation places an "undue
here was lessened to test whether
58
burden" on the individual.
(discussing how Danforth Court specifically discussed fathers' right to decide fate of fetus,
exersising balancing test of mother's rights against those of father and state).
52 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 56-59. The Missouri legislation contained several clauses that
regulated and controlled all abortions within Missouri. Id. at 56. These regulations included written consent requirements, civil and criminal penalties for the doctor if the fetus
died, and similar sanctions against the parents if the fetus survived the attempted abortion. Id. at 58-59.
53 Id. at 60-61. The "pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy' for she 'carries
an embryo and, later, a fetus.... [t]he woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of
privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly'." Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 159 (1973)).
54 Id. at 61 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 154); see Sharrin, supra note 51, at 1388 (discussing
balancing test applied in Danforth compared to prior abortion cases); Walters, supra note
51, at 175 (comparing Danforth to other abortion cases and use of balancing test). It is
significant to note at this time that the real issue behind some of these statements is how
the court defined 'viability', or when a fetus becomes life. Id. In Roe, viability occurs after
the second trimester, or, 28 weeks, which is when the fetus could live outside the mother's
womb, even though it might require artificial support. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 63. The issues
behind Roe and PlannedParenthood are also the issues at the heart of the "AIDS Baby"
Bill controversy, but viability is not an underlying issue. See infra Part III (discussing issues from Roe and Planned Parenthoodwith the "AIDS Baby" Bill).
55 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see McClard, supra note 45, at 2050-53 (discussing impact of
Casey on Roe decision).
56 Casey, 505 U.S. at 898 (commenting that state power over regulating abortions is
greater than husband's right over wife); see also McClard, supra note 45, at 2050-53 (discussing impact of stare decisis of Roe on Casey decision).
57 Casey, 505 U.S. at 835-36.
58 Id. at 860. The Court explained that they were not overruling Roe, but merely modifying the actual moment when the state's right to interfere outweighs the mother's individual
right to have an abortion. Id. "It is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some
freedom to terminate her pregnancy ....The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however,
that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn... and at a
later point in fetal development the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the
right.., can be restricted." Id. at 868; see Valerie J. Pacer, Note, Salvaging the Undue
Burden Standard - Is it a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental
Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 303 (1995) (discussing how Casey first applied un-
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In Casey, the Court, after applying the balancing test, gave
states more power to intervene in the abortion arena when the
interests of the fetus are implicated. 59 The Court has applied the
balancing test in other medical situations and the balance has
tipped in favor of the state in those cases. The Court's rationale in
the two cases that follow should be applied by legislatures when
addressing the privacy issues behind confidentiality and disclosure in the area of AIDS.6 °
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,6 1 the plaintiff claimed that a statute requiring smallpox vaccination was unconstitutional.6 2 The
Court weighed the state police power to protect the public against
the rights of the individual, 63 and concluded that public protection
due burden standard in evaluating state regulation intruding on adult's fundamental
rights); see also Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in ConstitutionalDoctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 878-92 (1994) (clarifying proper
analysis under undue burden standard as looking to both legislative purpose and effect on
individual's right to choose abortion). For an interesting analysis of the potential ethical
consequences of the Casey decision when considering state police power, see generally
Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible"Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 366 (1996) (stating
Casey offers "the most elaborate justification to date for a protected realm of personal decisionmaking premised on the requirements of personhood and moral responsibility, while
upholding state measures designed to steer such decisionmaking against abortion in name
of encouraging 'wise' (or responsible) exercise of reproductive liberty.") (footnote omitted).
59 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (holding abortion not fundamental right, requiring "strict
scrutiny" judicial review, instead treating law under "undue burden" standard); see also
Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking Process, 4
WM. & MARY BaL RTS. J. 787, 800 (1996) (discussing how Casey permits many more state

regulations on right of abortion, specifically on ability to tax abortion); Donald P. Judges,
Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference, and Abortion, 73 N.C. L.
REv. 1323, 1432 (1995) (discussing how Casey cut back on individual's right to abortion);
Mary A. Totz, What's Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander: Toward Recognition of
Men's Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 141, 160 (1994) (discussing how Casey
additionally limits right to privacy through stronger balancing test).
60 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (mandating certain individuals must
forego certain privacy rights when there is a greater benefit to whole society by disclosure);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (discussing health, peace and well-being
of population-at-large is more important than individual's right to act contrary to societal
norm).
61 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

62 Id. The challenged Massachusetts statute required all residents to be vaccinated for
smallpox. Id. at 12. Petitioner claimed that this law violated his rights as held generally
under the preamble to the Constitution. Id. at 12-14. Petitioner contended that the statute
violated his constitutional rights that are secured by the preamble and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 13-14, 22.
63 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25-27. The court said:
The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject of such reasonable conditions as
may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety,
health, peace, good order and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is only
freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same
right of others. Then it is liberty regulated by law.
Id. at 26-27 (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).
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against a potential smallpox epidemic outweighed the individual's
right to refuse the vaccination. 4 The Court applied the privacy
right balancing test in another medical context when it evaluated
a New York Statute requiring individuals receiving certain prescription drugs to register with the state.6 5 Whalen v. Roe6 6 held

that the state's broad police power encompassed the authority to
mandate filing of prescription drug forms with the state and,
therefore, the requirement was not an impermissible invasion of
the patient's right to privacy.67 The rationale applied in these
cases should apply when considering the right of doctors to know
the HIV-status of patients and the right of infants to know their
own HIV-status versus the patients' and mothers' right of privacy
not to disclose.6
The right to privacy concerning AIDS-confidentiality protection
and disclosure requirements should be treated as a state matter
64 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 37-39; see, e.g., Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 386 (1902) (holding state's police power includes authority to quarantine individuals that pose health threat to public); Davis v.
State, 451 A.2d 107, 111 (Md. 1982) (holding compulsory immunization for school-aged
children need not be triggered by epidemic); People ex rel. Barmore v. Robinson, 134 N.E.
815, 817 (Ill. 1922) (stating authority to quarantine individuals with contagious disease
that threatens public welfare is within state's police power). See generally Susan J. Levy,
The ConstitutionalImplications of Mandatory Testing for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - AIDS, 37 EMORY L.J. 217, 242 (1988) (discussing Jacobson in light of AIDS epidemic); Vicki L. Melton, Comment, Without Probable Cause: The ConstitutionalRamifications of Mandatory AIDS Testing in the Workplace, 57 UMKC L. Rxv. 863, 887-89 (1989)
(using rationale of Jacobson when comparing spread of AIDS with spread of smallpox);
Lisa Simotas, Note, In Search of a Balance:AIDS, Rape, and the Special Needs Doctrine, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1881, 1908-09 (1991) (discussing Jacobson decision as "protecting the public
health" and granting state right to protect it's citizens from such threat).
65 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (reversing Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp.
931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) and holding New York drug registration statutes is constitutionally
permissible infringement into individual's right of privacy by weighing patient's right to
confidentiality against state's interest in preventing illicit drug use); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980) (discussing whether state statute limiting funds for statefunded abortion violated constitutional right to privacy); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977) (balancing minor's right to privacy concerning contraceptives
against state's interest in discouraging illicit sexual conduct between minors under sixteen
years of age).
66 429 U.S. at 589.
67 Id. at 602 (recognizing that there are many occasions when disclosure of medical information is necessary in areas of health care and these invasions do not consitutue impermissible intrusion of privacy).
68 See, e.g., Judges, supra note 59, at 1433 (discussing how Casey Court implied greater
state power to regulate medical proceedures); Seth F. Kreimer, Essay, Does Pro-Choice
Mean Pro-Kevorkian?An Essay on Roe, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. Rv. 803,
834 (1995) (discussing right of"personal autonomy and bodily integrity" described in Casey
can be transferred to right to die); Jennifer P. Brown, Comment, "Unwanted,Anonymous,
Biological Descendants":Mandatory Donation Laws and Laws ProhibitingPreembryo Discard Violate the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 183, 224 (1993) (applying Casey standard in in-vitro fertilization medical circumstances).
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as the Court treated Casey, Jacobson, and Whalen.69 Additional
legislative action is required in the area of health care disclosure
requirements for the individuals involved in the physician-patient
relationship, and for newborn babies testing positive for HIV, to
prevent the precipitous spread of AIDS in these high-risk
situations.70
II.

THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

The physician-patient relationship is highly respected in American society."v Our legal system similarly recognizes the importance of this relationship by affording the physician-patient privilege.7 2 This privilege, however, is not absolute.7v The qualified
69 Many states have drafted and passed statutes that protect an HIV or AIDS-infected
individual's right to keep his health status private. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFrEY
§ 120980 (West 1996) (statute penalizing unauthorized disclosure of AIDS status); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-583 (West 1995) (restricting release of AIDS information); GA. STAT. § 249-47 (1996) (limiting disclosure of AIDS status); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 410 § 305/9 (SmithHurd 1996) (forbidding disclosure of AIDS status except under limited circumstances); LA.
REV. STAT. § 1300.11 (West 1995) (describing intent to restrict disclosure of AIDS status);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2781, 2782 (McKinney 1996) (requiring maintainance of confidentiality of individual HIV or AIDS-infected status with certain very limited exceptions);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243 (Baldwin 1996) (restricting release of AIDS information);
PENN. STAT. ANN. 35 § 7602 (West 1995) (discussing legislative intent against disclosure of
AIDS information).
70 See, e.g., Juliet J. McKenna, Where Ignorance is Not Bliss: A Proposal for Mandatory
HIV Testing of Pregnant Women, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 133, 134 (1996) (suggesting
mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women will help women protect their own health and
that of their newborn, and to make important choices concerning reproduction); Jody B.
Gabel, Comment, Liability for 'Knowing' Transmissionof HIV: The Evolution of a Duty to
Disclose, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 981, 1015-17 (1994) (discussing disclosure of HIV status in
medical situations). But see Eric N. Richardson & Salvatore J. Russo, CalmingAIDS Phobia:Legal Implicationsof the Low Risk of TransmittingHIV in the Health Care Setting, 28
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 733, 737 (1995) (arguing unwise and unnecessary to require disclosure
of HIV status by health care workers); Suzanne Sangree, Control of Childbearingby HIVPositive Women: Some Responses to Emerging Legal Policies, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 309, 356
(1993) (arguing more liberal disclosure policies will lead to illegal coercion of women's
child-bearing choices).
71 See 84 N.Y. JuR. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 133 (1995) (stating
that since medical practitioner is learned in medical field, patient must rely heavily on
doctor's advice); see also T.C. Smith & T.L. Thompson, The Inherent, Powerful Therapeutic
Value of a Good Physician-PatientRelationship, PSYCHOSOMATICS, Mar-Apr 1993, at 1. See
generally Glen 0. Gabbard & Carol Nadelson, Professional Boundaries in the PhysicianPatientRelationship, 273 JAMA 1445 (1995) (noting that physician's power position is result of factors including higher levels of education, socioeconomic status and inherent social
power).
72 See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4504 (McKinney Supp. 1995) (stating that in New
York, confidential information disclosed by patients to physicians, dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors or nurses is protected by virtue of relationship, unless protection is specifically
waived by patient); see also Wanda E. Wakefield, Annotation, Physician.PatientPrivilege
as Extending to Patient'sMedical or HospitalRecords, 10 A.L.R. 4th 552, 557 (1994) (stating physician-patient privilege exists to "encourage a patient to be forthcoming with his
physician" so that physician can effectively treat patient). See generally 84 N.Y. Jun. 2D
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nature of the privilege reflects the realization that even this relationship must occasionally yield to the public welfare.7 4
Specifically, the spread of AIDS has prompted something of a
metamorphosis in the physician-patient relationship.7 5 As a result
of this tragic disease, an increasing number of doctors are themselves becoming HIV-positive. 76 A recent Maryland case illustrates this unprecedented transformation of the traditional physician-patient relationship. 7 7 In Doe v. University of Maryland
Medical System Corporation,78 the plaintiff doctor was fired because of his HIV-positive status.7 9
Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 133 (1995) (noting physician is in position of
trust and confidence with patient and therefore in special position to influence opinion and
decision of patient); id. § 136 (listing patient remedies for unauthorized disclosure by medical practitioner).
73 See Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding there is no absolute
right of physician-patient confidentiality, and for disclosure to be wrongful, "it must be
without legal justification or excuse"); Camperlengo v. Blum, 436 N.E.2d 1299, 1300 (N.Y.
1982) (explaining that privilege is not absolute shield to subpoena); McBarnette v. Feldman, 582 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (stating privilege is not absolute and must
therefore yield to overriding public policy); Sheila Taub, Doctors,AIDS, and Confidentiality
in the 1990's, 27 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 331, 332 (1994) (noting privilege, although having
ancient roots, is not unlimited).
74 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (recognizing that physician-patient
privilege is subject to various exceptions); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805
(4th Dep't 1982) (stating that countervailing public interest supersedes patient's right to
privacy under certain circumstances); Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (noting duty of nondisclosure in physician-patient relationship must be weighed after balancing all competing
interests); 61 AM. Jim. 2D Physicians,Surgeons, and Other Healers § 170 (1981) (recognizing subjugation of individual interest to public policy when patient has infectious or contagious disease); Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications:Medical and Counseling Privileges, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1530, 1530, 1538 (1985) (noting most states have

adopted statutory exceptions whereby privilege yields in cases of child abuse).
75 Jeffrey H. Samet et al., A Model Clinic for the InitialEvaluation and Establishmentof
PrimaryCare for Persons Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 155 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 1629, 1629 (1995) (noting overwhelming complexity of diagnosis and treatment of HIV-positive patients); see also D.G. Rischitelli, The Confidentiality of Medical Information in the Workplace, J. OF OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED., May 1995, at 583 (stating

that management of HIV-related information in physician-patient relationship poses special confidentiality issues).
76 See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Reverse Informed Consent: The UnreasonablyDangerous
Patient, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (1993) (discussing role reversal of patients and doctors); Living With the ADA, TEx. LAW., Apr. 25, 1994, at 24 (noting increasing number of
HIV-positive physicians); Steven Findlay, If Your Doctor Has AIDS, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Feb. 18, 1991, at 66 (noting increased public concern of patients due to well-publicized cases of doctors with HIV-infection continuing to treat patients); Barbara Kantrowtiz
et al., Doctors and AIDS, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 49 (quoting health officials as saying
public reaction to physicians with AIDS has bordered on hysteria).
77 See Doe v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1995)
(upholding dismissal by hospital of HIV-positive physician).
78 50 F.3d at 1261.

79 Id. at 1263. The parties did not dispute that if the plaintiff physician were not HIVpositive, he would be qualified to remain on staff as a neurosurgical resident at the defendant medical institution. Id. at 1265. He was terminated solely because he is HIV-positive
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Dr. "Doe," a neurosurgical resident at the University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, was stuck with a needle during
the performance of his duties, and subsequently tested positive for
HIV.8 0 The hospital's expert panel put forth recommendations

that Dr. Doe refrain from certain invasive procedures and rigorously follow infection control procedures."1 Hospital administrators refused to follow these recommendations.8 2 Instead, they permanently suspended the doctor from surgical practice when he
refused their offer of alternative residency opportunities.8 3 Upholding the decision of the district court, the Fourth Circuit found
that Dr. Doe's HIV-positive status posed a significant health risk
to his patients, despite the possibility of his taking extra precautions.8 4 The court held that, contrary to Dr. Doe's argument, the
hospital did not violate the Rehabilitation Act 85 or the Americans
with Disabilities Act 8 6 by discriminating against an otherwise

qualified individual with a disability.8 7
This case arose in a constantly changing atmosphere of confusion with regard to disclosure by HIV or AIDS infected health care
and would not relinquish his surgical position to assume alternative responsibilities within
his profession. Id. at 1262-63.
80 Id. at 1262. This incident occurred while Dr. Doe was treating an individual who may
have been infected with the HIV virus. Id. The court notes, however, that it is not known
whether Dr. Doe became infected from this incident, or whether he became infected at some
prior time. Id. at n.4.
81 Id. at 1262. The panel recommended that Dr. Doe be permitted to continue his surgical responsibilities, with the exception of those procedures requiring the use of exposed
wire which was deemed too risky. Id. The panel further proposed measures to be taken if
Dr. Doe's blood ever came in contact with a patient's non-intact skin. Id.
82 Doe v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1262 (4th Cir. 1995).
83 Id. at 1263. Senior hospital administrators offered Dr. Doe residencies in non-surgical
areas of practice. Id. at 1263.
84 Doe v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995). The
court stated:
We hold that Dr. Doe does pose a significant risk to the health and safety of his patients that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation .... Thus, even if Dr.
Doe takes extra precautions (such as wearing two pairs of gloves, making stitches with
only one hand, and using blunt-tipped, solid-bore needles) some measure of risk will
always exist because of the type of activities in which Dr. Doe is engaged.
Id.
85 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
86 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. 1993).
87 Doe v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1995). Dr.
Doe's claims at his trial alleged violations under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 1262. Collectively, these statutes prohibit
discrimination by a public entity against otherwise qualified individuals on the basis of a
disability. Id. at 1264 nn.7-8. The court determined that the risk to the patients of HIV
transmission was too great to be eliminated by "reasonable accommodation" and therefore,
the hospital did not violate either the Rehabilitation or the Americans with Disabilities
Acts. Id. at 1267.
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workers.8 8 States are dictating varying policies concerning both
HIV-positive and AIDS-infected health care workers.8 9
While other states have compulsory HIV testing, New York does
not impose mandatory testing, 90 either for health care workers or
for Disease
for patients. 91 The guidelines set forth by the Centers
92
Control explains in part these varying responses.
88 See Gary I. Strausberg & Randal D. Getz, Health Care Workers With AIDS: Duties,
Rights, and Potential Tort Liability, 21 U. BALT. L. REv. 285, 287 (1992) (discussing ethical
aspects of physician-patient relationship, potential tort liability raised by breach of confidentiality, and possible damages for emotional distress of patients who fear contracting
disease from HIV-positive physicians). See generally Mark D. Johnson, HIV Testing of
Health Care Workers: Conflict Between the Common Law and the Centers For Disease Control, 42 Am. U. L. REV. 479, 481-83 (1993) (discussing guidelines promulgated by Centers
for Disease Control and integration of same into statutory and common law of states); Can
You Get AIDS From Your Doctor?, CONSUMER's RESEARCH MAG., Mar. 1992, at 15 (noting
debate in Congress and elsewhere over mandatory testing of health-care workers and concluding mandatory testing of health-care workers is inappropriate and inadvisable).
89 See FLA. STAT. ch. 381.004 (1994) (requiring testing of health care workers only in
certain specific circumstances); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.204 (West 1995)
(prohibiting HIV-infected health-care workers from performing "exposure-prone" procedures without seeking counsel and permission of expert review panel); S.C. House Bill
4151, Statewide Session (1992) (requiring health care workers in South Carolina to submit
to HIV test when applying for license and upon license renewal); Taub, supra note 73, at
332 (noting great variability among different states' statutes governing AIDS confidentiality). See generally Eisenstat, supra note 10, at 328 (noting states have proposed variety of
testing schemes).
90 See, e.g., Plaza v. Estate of Wisser, 626 N.Y.S.2d 446, 452 (1st Dep't 1995) (holding
that while mandatory testing of those suspected to have venereal disease is required by
Public Health Law § 2300, individuals who are suspected of having HIV are not required to
undergo testing); Kevin J. Cumin, Note, Newborn HIV Screening and New York Assembly
Bill No. 6747-B: Privacy and Equal Protection of PregnantWomen, 21 FoReHAm URm. L.J.
857, 860 (1994) (citing Report of Subcommittee on Newborn HIV Screening of New York
State AIDS Advisory Council 5 (Feb. 10, 1994) indicating lack of mandatory HIV testing).
91 See FLA. STAT. ch. 381.004 (1994) (requiring testing of health care workers only in
certain specific circumstances); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 18-338.1 (1995) (requiring
periodic testing of health care workers); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.204(c)
(West 1995) (requiring infected health-care workers notify prospective patients of HIV-positive status, and to obtain informed consent of patients before performing exposure-prone
procedure); S.C. House Bill 4151, Statewide Session (1992) (requiring health care workers
in South Carolina to submit to HIV test when applying for license and upon license
renewal).
92 See 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2 (Law. Co-op. 1995). The guidelines are for the "Prevention of
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency and Hepatitis B Viruses During Invasive Procedures," and mandate that:
[E]ach State Public Health Official shall ... certify to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services that guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control, or guidelines which are equivalent to those promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control
concerning recommendations for preventing the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus and the hepatitits B virus during exposure prone invasive procedures, except for emergency situations when the patient's life of limb is in danger, have
been instituted in the State. State guidelines shall apply to health professionals practicing within the State and shall be consistent with Federal law.
Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 88, at 481-82 (indicating that Congress has not enacted
legislation requiring HIV testing for health care workers, but that CDC guidelines require
states to adopt practice guidelines).
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Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Guidelines and The New
York Response

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC), partially in response to
the hysteria resulting from rare but well-publicized cases of HIV
transmission from health-care workers to patients,93 promulgated
guidelines designed to stay the spread of the HIV virus. 9 4 The
CDC guidelines compel states to enact responsive guidelines
which may either mirror or be stricter than those prescribed by
the CDC, 95 and additionally, dictate punishment for non-compliance. 96 New York has enacted legislation mandating training for
health care workers regarding9 7infection control and precautions to
prevent transmission of HIV.
In New York tort law, the transmission of HIV constitutes a
toxic tort. 98 Nonetheless, New York health law does not statuto93 See Jane H. Barney, Comment, A Health Care Worker's Duty to UndergoRoutine Testing for HIV/AIDS and to Disclose Positive Results to Patients, 52 LA. L. REv. 933, 935
(1992) (noting heightened public awareness of risk of contracting AIDS from HIV-infected
health-care workers as result of infection of Kimberly Bergalis by her dentist); P. Dean
Brinkley, Comment, Health Care Worker's Legal Duty to Disclose HIV-Positive Status to
Patients Before Performing Invasive Procedures, 29 TuLSA L.J. 429, 429-30 (1993) (highlighting Kimberly Bergalis as first documented patient to contract AIDS virus from health
care worker); see also Jennifer Hertz, Comment, Physicians With AIDS: A Proposal for
Efficient Disclosure, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 749, 750 n.6 (1992) (citing Centers for Disease Control, Possible TransmissionofHuman Immunodeficiency Virus to a PatientDuring an Invasive Dental Procedure)in 39 Moammrry AND MORTALrrY WKLY RPrr 489 (July 27, 1990) and
concluding that alleged HIV transmission from dentist to three patients has renewed debate concerning disclosure of HIV-status by physicians); Peter Pallot, 1,300 Offered AIDS
Test After Dentist Kept on Working, ThE DAiLY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 11, 1995, at 7
(discussing AIDS-infected dentist who continued treating patients after being requested
not to do so by his treating physician).
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2 (Law. Co-op. 1995). The guidelines are for the "Prevention of
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency and Hepatitis B Viruses During Invasive Procedures." Id. The guidelines require all states to enact either the CDC guidelines for the
prevention of disease transmission, or guidelines which are substantially equivalent. Id.
These guidelines are required to be followed by health professionals performing invasive
procedures. Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. The guidelines provide for state ineligibility for assistance under the Public Health
Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1995), until the Secretary has provided the requisite certification. Id.
97 See N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 6505-b (McKinney 1995) (mandating dentists, registered and
licensed nurses, optometrists, podiatrists, and dental hygienists complete training appropriate to their practice to control HIV infection in workplace); N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAw § 239
(McKinney 1995) (requiring classes and training in HIV infection control methods for physicians and physician assistants).
98 See Plaza v. Estate of Wisser, 626 N.Y.S.2d 446, 451 (1st Dep't 1995). The court, relying on the authority ofDiMarco v. Hudson Valley Blood. Servs., 541 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1st Dep't
1989) and Prego v. City ofNew York, 541 N.Y.S.2d 995 (2d Dep't 1989), extended the application of CPLR 214-c to actions for recovery for latent injuries caused by exposure to AIDS
contaminated blood. Id. The court further noted that it is "irrelevant whether the virus was
transmitted via blood through a transfusion or via semen as a result of sexual contact." Id.
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rily consider AIDS to be a sexually transmitted disease. 9 9 The
New York Public Health Law purposely omits HIV from the list of
sexually transmissible diseases for varying public policy reasons. 10 0 The overriding public policy reason for keeping HIV off
the list of transmissible diseases is the high value that New York
places upon the privacy of its citizens.10 '
The First Department, by acknowledging AIDS as a toxic tort, seems to analogize AIDS to
other torts like exposure to asbestos or diethylstilbestrol (DES). Id. at 451. The Historical
and Statutory notes after N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c include these substances in the
discussion of personal injury or death actions caused by latent effects of exposure to substances such as these. Id. This tort has a three year statute of limitations accruing from the
date of discovery. N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c (2) (McKinney 1990). Id. This statute of
limitations for personal injury caused by latent effects of exposure to any substance, in any
form, upon or within the body is three years from the date of discovery of the injury by the
plaintiff, or three years from the date at which a reasonable exercise of due diligence would
have disclosed the injury. Id.
99 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2311 (McKinney 1993). The New York Commissioner of
Health must designate certain diseases as "sexually transmitted". Id. The statute directs
the Commissioner to put forth a list of sexually transmissible diseases, such as gonorrhea
and syphilis, to achieve the goal of Article 23 which is the care, treatment and control of
sexually transmissible diseases. Id; see also New York State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod,
77 N.Y.2d 677, 686 (1991). The Commissioner of Health's decision to keep HIV infection off
the list of sexually transmissible diseases was unanimously affirmed by the New York
Court of Appeals. Id. The Health Commissioner is not required to list every sexually transmissible disease, but instead should make determination after considering attendant circumstances of disease. Id. at 683. The court held that designating HIV infection as a communicable or sexually transmissible disease ultimately would be detrimental to the public
health, since to do so would trigger reporting requirements. Id. at 684. The court agreed
with the respondent's argument that these reporting requirements would serve to deter
infected individuals from testing and treatment, and therefore would have an overall detrimental effect on public health. Id. at 687. Reporting could also trigger discriminatory treatment of infected individuals. Id. at 686.
100 See e.g., Tischler v. DiMenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (stating that
"[I1n New York, for policy reasons against involuntary testing, AIDS is not listed by the
state health authorities as a sexually transmittable disease, though it is communicable
through sexual contact."); Roth v. New York Blood Ctr., 596 N.Y.S.2d 639, 643 (Sup. Ct.
1993) (emphasizing legislative intent underlying Public Health Code, article 27-F, which
defines confidential HIV related information, was to ensure confidentiality so publication of
results would not be bar to testing); New York State Soc'y of Surgeons, 77 N.Y.2d at 685
(noting that placement of diseases onto list of sexually transmitted diseases may trigger
statutory reporting provisions); see also Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1992)
(stating that Axelrod determination to keep HIV off transmissible disease list was rationally based on public policy to encourage voluntary testing). But see N.Y.A. 2799, 219th Sess.
(1995) (proposed bill designating AIDS and HIV as both communicable and sexually transmissible disease therefore invoking public health protection measures).
101 See Nolley v. Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 728 (1991) (finding disclosure of HIV-positive
status of inmate to holding center employees was not necessary to protect safety of workers
and violated article 27-F of public health law mandating confidentiality); Doe v. Roe, 599
N.Y.S.2d 350, 352-53 (4th Dep't 1993) (declaring New York has strong public policy concern
in protecting confidentiality of HIV and AIDS sufferers); Taub, supra note 73, at 334 (discussing New York confidentiality statute governing AIDS and noting New York's strong
public policy favoring confidentiality of patient's HIV-status as found in Doe v. Roe). See
generally Edward R. Alexander, Note and Comment, The Right of Privacy and the New
York State Constitution: An Analytical Framework, 8 TouRo L. REv. 725, 727 (1992) (asserting fundamental right of privacy guaranteed under New York Constitution is more expansive than federal right of privacy).
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and confidentiality of HIV-

related information
are all statutorily protected in New York.
New York's HIV confidentiality statute is among the most stringent in the nation. 10 5 New York courts have rarely permitted
forced disclosure of AIDS or HIV status. 0 6 One of the only instances where disclosure of HIV status is mandated is at the request of a sex crime victim. 10 7
Although a statutory arsenal of privacy protections exists, there
is clearly an imbalance in the application of those protections. 08
102 See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992) (prohibiting use of person's
'name, portrait or picture" without written consent and granting relief for violations
thereof).
103 See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4504 (McKinney 1992) (providing that confidential information exchanged between doctor and patient is privileged); see also MacDonald v.
Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (4th Dep't 1982) (noting common law cause of action exists
for physician's breach of confidentiality).
104 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2782(1) (McKinney 1993) (providing that no one may
disclose or be compelled to disclose HIV-related information unless specifically authorized
by this article).
105 See Salvatore J. Russo, State and FederalAIDS Laws in Conflict Over Privacy and
Notification Questions, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 1993, at 9 (stating that New York has one of
strictest HIV-AIDS confidentiality statutes); see also Cumin, supra note 90, at 860 (noting
N.Y. AIDS Baby Bill, No. 6747-B, requires amendment of Article 27-F of Public Health
Law, which is among strictest confidentiality statutes).
106 See People v. Durham, 553 N.Y.S.2d 944, 947 (Sup. Ct. 1990). The court held that a
defendant who divulged his status to his victim during a sexual attack could not subsequently invoke his constitutional privilege of privacy. Id.; People v. Thomas, 529 N.Y.S.2d
429, 431 (Schoharie County Ct. 1988). The court permitted the State to obtain a blood specimen from defendant convicted of rape and sodomy to determine whether he had been exposed to AIDS virus. Id. The court reasoned that the victim's right to know whether she
may have been exposed to the AIDS virus outweighed the intrusion upon the defendant of a
routine blood test. Id; see also Plaza v. Estate of Wisser, 626 N.Y.S.2d 446, 454 (1st Dep't
1995). The court held that N.Y. Public Health Law § 2782(c) "supersedes" the doctor-patient privilege when a compelling need is shown for the disclosure of HIV-related information regarding a patient. Id.
107 See, e.g., N.Y. Cam. PRoc. LAw § 390.15 (McKinney 1995). This law took effect on
August 1, 1995. Id. It requires HIV-related testing at the victim's request in cases where
the defendant is convicted of "an act of 'sexual intercourse' or 'deviate sexual intercourse"
as defined elsewhere in the penal law. Id.
108 See Richard Denatale & Shawn D. Parrish, Health Care Workers'Ability to Recover in
Tort for Transmission or Fearof Transmissionof HIV From a Patient, 36 SANTA CLARA L.
REV.751, 751 (1996) (noting legislatures and courts have focused primarily on physician to
patient transmission and not vice versa); Mary K. Logan, Who's Afraid of Whom? Courts
Require HIV-Infected Doctors to Obtain Informed Consent of Patients, 44 DEPAuL L. REv.
483, 483-84 (1995) (noting "emerging legal trend to require HIV-infected doctors to disclose
their HIV status to their patients" and evaluating impact on public policy); Denise C. Singleton, Note, Nonconsensual HIV Testing in the Health Care Setting: The Case for Extending the OccupationalProtectionsof CaliforniaProposition96 to Health Care Workers,
26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1251, 1273 (1993) (noting legal obligation of physicians to treat all
patients, including those HIV-infected, and arguing legal burden should be balanced by
requiring patients' duty to inform health-care providers of positive HIV-status); see also
Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy:Protecting PatientsFrom Their Physicians,
55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 291, 330-70 (1994) (discussing doctor's duty to disclose in physicianpatient relationship under three different theories of legal liability).
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Health care workers are afforded less privacy rights than ordinary
citizens.' 0 9 It would seem that health status disclosures should
not require communication only by the physician to his patient.
Ethical, if not equitable, considerations mandate that where patients are aware of their HIV-positive status, they should be required to inform the health care workers who treat them. 1 0
B. Extending Mandatory Disclosure to Patients as Well as
Doctors
Probabilities of actually transferring the AIDS virus would
seem to indicate that physicians bear a greater risk of accidental
infection than do their patients."' The average patient goes to the
doctor several times a year and, on the average, probably will not
see more than a couple of different physicians on those occasions. 1 1 2 The average physician, however, depending on his area
109 See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (concluding that "patient's rights must prevail" and therefore
mandating physicians must disclose their own HIV-status to their patients as part of informed consent procedure); Debra A. Abbott, Comment, Workplace Exposure to AIDS, 48
MD. L. Rav. 212, 213-14 (1989) (noting privacy protections for patients force health care
workers to either accept risk of infection as part of doing job or to assume every patient is
AIDS-infected and take requisite precautions with all patients); Singleton, supra note 108,
at 1253, 1271 (stating California health care workers have no legal means to compel patient HIV-testing despite occupational exposure to blood or body fluids of patient); see also
Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 334, 338-39 (Md. 1993) (declining to say that AIDS-infected
surgeon had no duty to obtain informed consent from his patients prior to surgery, and
further that patients' fear of contracting HIV was compensable injury).
110 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, § 325/5.5 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (permitting infected patient
to inform health care provider and vice versa before Health Department takes measures to
notify parties); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.656(5) (Vernon 1996) (requiring HIV-infected individuals disclose status to any health care professional from whom they seek help); see also
Taub, supra note 73, at 332 (noting statutory exemption to confidentiality of patient's HVstatus exists in some states for health care workers exposed to infected individuals).
111 Doe v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1263 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995)
(stating "[there is to date no documented case of an HIV-positive surgeon transmitting the
virus to a patient, even through there are a number of known cases of HIV-positive surgeons operating on patients"); see also In re Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592
A.2d 1251, 1279 (N.J. Super. 1991) (stating "[tihe risk of infection from surgeon to patient
is much lower than in the opposite direction"); David C. Wyld et al., The Right to Know and
the Right to Privacy: HIV Testing and Health Care Management, HEALTH CARE SUPERVIsosi, March 1992, at 56 (noting there have been several dozen cases of health care workers
becoming HIV-positive after coming into contact with infected blood at work).
112 See Simone Sandier, Health Service Utilization and Physician Income Trends, 10
HEALTH CARE FiNANCING REv. 33 (1989) (noting survey by National Center for Health Statistics that quotes figure of 5.3 patient visits per year to physician); G.L. Weiss and C.A.
Ramsey, Regular Source of PrimaryMedical Care and PatientSatisfaction, QuALrrv REv.
BuLL., June 1989, at 180 (noting increased patient satisfaction when maintaining continuity with single physician). See generally N.R. Bell, Continuity of Care: Opportunity for
Residents to See Repeat Patients, CANADLAN FAm. PHysimIAN, Nov. 1995, at 1880 (finding
residents had repeat contact with 25.9% of patients seen during four month period).
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of specialty, will likely see thousands of different patients each
year. 1 1 3 Thus, physicians statistically bear the greater risk of exposure. 1 1 4 It would, therefore, seem that the statutory protections
for individuals with infectious diseases would tip in favor of those
most likely to be the susceptible partner in the relationship - the
doctor. Presently, however, this is not the case and most privi15
leges of confidentiality favor the patient.
Additionally, the respective positions in the relationship between the patient and physician would also seem to support this
conclusion. A surgical patient lying open on an operating table, a
woman in the process of natural childbirth, or an emergency room
patient all would be more likely to spill infected blood than a prop-

113 See Stephany Boyd, Bucksport Health Center Plans to Double its Size, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, October 19, 1996 (describing expansion of health facility where six physicians will
see 22,000 patients in 1996); Phillip Lutz, Health Clinics Strain to Meet New Demands,
N.Y. TnAMs, May 19, 1996, at Long Island Weekly p.1 (stating fourteen Long Island county
clinics treated 102,300 patients in 1995); Dan Monk, Health Center Faces Fund-Raising
Test, CiNciNNATi Bus. COURIER, Feb. 5, 1996, at 15 (noting Cincinnati Health Network
oversees seven health clinics that treated 90,200 patients in 1995); Sandier, supra note 112
(noting that number of visits for general practitioners in United States in 1986 was 6,723).
114 See Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S. 2d 236, 242 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (stating that patient undergoing intrusive physical exam poses equal risk of transmitting this deadly disease to unsuspecting health care worker who may subsequently transmit virus to others); AIDS FromAn
M.D.?: Not Likely, Say Three Studies of HIV-Positive Doctorsand Their Patients,TinE, Apr.
26, 1993, at 17 (citing three studies of J.A.M.A. which found doctors are more likely to
contract AIDS virus from patient than vice versa); Barney, supra note 93, at 938-39 (stating doctor is more likely to be exposed to patient's body fluids than vice versa and therefore
physician bears greater risk); Wyld et al, supra note 111, at 56 (stating that "It]here have
been several dozen documented cases of health care workers seroconverting due to exposure to HIV-infected blood or bodily fluids in the work setting").
115 See ALA. CODE § 22-11a-51 (1996) (requiring health care provider obtain informed
consent of patient prior to testing individual for HIV infection); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19a-582 (West 1996) (requiring oral or written informed consent of patient prior to HIV
testing); DEL. CODE ANN. § 1202 (1995) (stating no HIV-related testing may be performed
without prior informed consent of individual); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47 (1996) (requiring
information about individual's HIV status remain confidential); HAW. REv. STAT. § 325-16
(1995) (requiring written informed consent before administering HIV test); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§191.656 (Vernon 1996) (stating information relating to person's HIV status be kept confidential); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7607 (1995) (limiting disclosure of individual's HIV status); see also Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283 (holding doctrine of informed consent demands
physicians disclose HIV-positive status because patients' rights far outweigh individual
physician's right to perform procedures); Doe, 50 F.3d at 1262 (holding that although plaintiff physician did not need to obtain informed consent from his patients, he was appropriately fired from his job by defendant hospital); Taub, supra note 73, at 331 (noting confidentiality statutes protecting patients require that physician obtain patient's informed consent
before testing patient for HIV-infection); Abbott, supra note 109, at 213 (noting current
public health practice is to protect privacy of infected patients by maintaining strictest
level of confidentiality). See generally N.Y. PUB HEALTH LAW Art. 27-F (safeguarding confidentiality of patient's HIV-related data in medical records).
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erly scrubbed surgeon, 1 16 who with his sterile uniform and gloves
1 17
takes necessary precautions to prevent such an occurrence.
Recently, the incident involving Greg Louganis drew public attention to the plight of a physician treating an AIDS patient."' 8
Mr. Louganis suffered a laceration from a diving accident in the
1988 Olympics and was treated by an Olympic physician." 9 He
accepted treatment from the physician, but did not disclose his
HIV-positive status until early in 1995.120 His failure to disclose
his status at the time he received emergency treatment has
sparked much debate as to whether he was a hero or a selfish patient.' 2 1 Louganis ultimately came forward as a public figure to
116 See In re Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1279 (N.J. Super.
1991). The court noted that while it is impossible to calculate accurately the actual risk of
HIV transmission from surgeons to patients, surgeons who get cut do not necessarily expose patients to their blood, and even if they did, the quantity involved is so minuscule as
to warrant a negligible result. Id. The court further stated that since the surgeon is in
significant contact with patient's blood and organs during a procedure, the cumulative risk
of HIV transmission to the surgeon is higher. Id. at 1279-80.
117 See Barry R. Furrow, AIDS and the Health Care Provider:The Argument for Voluntary HIV Testing, 34 Vn.L. L. REv. 823, 834, 836 (1989) (conceding that health care workers
are at increased occupational risk as compared to other professions and noting needle stick
injuries have infected at least fifteen health care workers); Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health
Care Professionals,and AIDS: The "Rightto Know" the Health Status of Professionalsand
Patients, 48 MD. L. REv. 12, 18 (1989) (noting risk of HIV transmission from patient to
physician in emergency room setting is an occupational risk); see also Oddi, supra note 76,
at 1423 (stating probability of HIV transmission from patient to physician is significantly
greater than vice versa).
118 See Louganis Describes PanicBecause of Injury, AIDS, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar.
19, 1995, at C1 (describing Louganis' accident at 1988 Olympics); Patrick Pacheco, So He's
Playing a Secondary Role in a Play that is Off-Broadway. Olympic Diver Greg Louganis
Wants to Act and He is Willing to Work For It, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 22, 1993, at 54
(discussing Louganis' accident at 1988 Olympics); see also GREG LOUGANIS WITH ERIC MARCUS, BREAKING THE SURFACE (1994) (Louganis discusses his homosexuality and HIV-positive condition in this autobiography).
119 See Dennis Byrne, Characterand Nobility Take a Dive, Ciu. SuN-TIMEs, Feb. 28,
1995, at 21 (noting that doctor who stitched Louganis' wound at 1988 Olympics was unaware of Louganis' positive HIV-status because of Louganis' failure to inform him); Louganis Describes Panic Because of Injury, AIDS, supra note 118, at C1 (quoting Greg Louganis as stating that Dr. Jim Puffer, Olympic Team doctor, was "digging around, trying to
find the wound" after Louganis hit his head on diving board); Charles Walston, Hitting the
Board, Prrr. PosT-GAZETrE, March 26, 1995, at D1 (noting most Americans have seen
videotape of Louganis' Olympic accident and diver that followed Louganis at Olympics,
Mark Bradshaw, did not see any blood on diving board or in pool).
120 See Jane R. Eisner, Lessons of Greg Louganis' Life, BERGEN RECORD, Mar. 14, 1995,
at B7 (describing Louganis as "selfish competitor" who could have made transmission impossible if treating physician knew to wear gloves).
121 See Byrne, supra note 119, at 21 (stating if Louganis' accident had been in Illinois, he
would be guilty of violating Health Care Worker Notification Act, pending in Illinois legislature and requiring patients to notify health-care workers of HIV-status before seeking
treatment); Eisner, supra note 120, at B7 (distinguishing between Louganis as "hero" and
Louganis as "cad"); cf. Joe Drape, With His Secrets in the Open, Louganis Says, "I'm Not
Alone," ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Mar. 6, 1995, at 6C (noting Louganis' increased popularity
and position of increased sympathy from public); Cookie Walter, Louganis Fairness, CHm.

828

ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 11:805

promote education on the subject of AIDS. 122 Nonetheless, because of the stigma of AIDS, he put his treating physician in a
potentially life-threatening situation by not disclosing his positive
status at the time of the emergency treatment. 123
Situations like that of Greg Louganis dictate that further action
is required to protect health care workers. 124 AIDS is a dangerous
disease. We must protect our doctors from potential exposure during their treatment of patients. By protecting doctors, we will in
turn protect other patients whom the doctor treats. 125
Federal and state legislatures appear reluctant to require
mandatory HIV testing and disclosure for doctors, and are clearly
reluctant to require testing for patients. 126 As a result, courts and
Thim., Mar. 14, 1995, at 14 (finding unfairness in holding Louganis strictly responsible
when attending Olympic physician did not wear protective gloves while treating Louganis).
122 See Eisner, supra note 120, at B7 (describing breadth of Louganis' public appearances from People magazine to television appearances with Barbara Walters and Oprah
Winfrey); see also Drape, supra note 121, at C6 (discussing overwhelming public support of
Louganis at Louganis' book signings); LOUGANIS & MARcus, supra note 118, at 1 (discussing disclosure of HIV status).
123 See Barney, supra note 93, at 938-39 (noting doctors' exposure to patients' body fluids
puts physicians at risk); Drape, supra note 121, at C6 (explaining that Louganis funded his
own medical expenses totalling hundreds of thousands of dollars, rather than seeking insurance reimbursement which entailed risk of his illness becoming public); Jane R. Eisner,
Privacy vs. Disclosure;Let's Expand on the Louganis Debate, PHOENIX GAZErrE, Mar. 11,
1995, at B7 (stating that Louganis' story should encourage fair debate regarding right to
privacy versus obligation to disclose HIV-positive status for protection of others); Louganis
Describes PanicBecause of Injury, AIDS, supra note 118, at C1 (Louganis states people who
came in direct contact with his blood were at risk).
124 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, § 325/5.5 (Smith-Hurd 1993) This statute permits investigation by the Health Department into allegations of HIV or AIDS infection. Id. The statute further authorizes notification of individuals that came into contact with infected persons, including both doctors who performed invasive procedures on an infected individual
and to patients who have been treated by an infected health care provider. Id; see also
Harrison L. Rogers, Jr., The Medical Profession and AIDS, 10 J. OF LEGAL MED. 1, 1 (1989)
(asserting that there should be mutual disclosure of HIV status in physician-patient relationship). See generally Russo, supra note 105, at 9 (stating that health care provider in
emergency situation will not have any information on patient's HIV status because most
people have not been tested, and if they have been tested, results are not available in an
emergency situation).
125 See Eisenstat, supra note 10, at 327 (stating that testing is thought to be necessary to
protect public health from further transmission of HIV virus); Gostin, supra note 117, at
20-21 (recognizing risks of transmission from patient to physician and advocating mutual
screening to curb overall levels of transmission); Eisner, supra note 123, at B7. "As long as
infection with the HIV virus confers an apparent death sentence, those who have it must
also consider the safety of others to a degree not demanded in other instances." Id; see also
Norman Daniels, HIV-Infected Health CareProfessionals:Public Threator PublicSacrifice,
MLLUANK Q., Mar. 22, 1992, at 3 (noting that many professional health care associations
have insisted that physicians and dentists have "duty to treat" all patients, including those
who are HIV-infected); Taub, supra note 73, at 343 (discussing conflicting needs of doctors,
HIV-infected individuals, and public, and urging abolishing confidentiality requirements to
curb spread of AIDS).
126 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2 (1996) (stating physician or dentist can request patient submit to HIV-related testing, but test is voluntary); N.Y.S. 88, 215th Sess. (1993)
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legal scholars have debated whether disclosure by a physician, for
his patient's benefit, should be made compulsory through the doctrine of informed consent.' 2 7 The doctrine of informed consent allows a patient to make a fully informed decision regarding his illness based on all the available knowledge and risks surrounding
his procedure. 2 ' Some jurisdictions already compel doctors to obtain the informed consent of their patients when engaging in medical activity where there is a potential risk of transmission of HIV
from an infected surgeon to a patient.' 2 9 The same standard
should also apply where there is a risk of transmission from a patient to his physician. 3 °
(proposing amendment of Public Health Law to create duty to disclose for both health care
workers and patients, but on which no action has been taken for two years); Anonymous
Fireman v. Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 418 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (upholding city's
mandatory testing of firefighters and paramedics for AIDS as part of annual physical
exam); see Denatale & Parrish, supra note 108, at 751 (noting several legislatures and
courts have addressed legal responsibilities of physician to patient transmission, but no
forum has considered patient's legal duty to warn health care workers); Singleton, supra
note 108, at 1253 (noting California law does not permit health care worker to compel patient to be tested for HIV after suffering occupational exposure to patient with unknown
HIV status, but acknowledging Proposal 96 permits emergency service workers ability to
compel testing of person who may have exposed them). See generally Russo, supra note 105,
at 9 (discussing New York's confidentiality statute).
127 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 108, at 483 (stating that three recent appellate court
cases indicate emerging trend towards requiring HIV-infected physicians to disclose HIV
status to patients); Michelle W. DeBarge, Note, The Performance of Invasive Procedures by
HIV-Infected Doctors: The Duty to Disclose Under the Informed Consent Doctrine,25 CONN.
L. REv. 991, 993 (1993) (noting that risk of HIV-infection is material risk to patient and
should require informed consent of patient before treatment commences); N.Y.A. 4516,
218th Sess. (1995) (compelling HIV or AIDS infected health care professionals to obtain
consent prior to performing procedures); see also Oddi, supra note 76, at 1446-53 (arguing
doctrine of informed consent should apply to HIV-positive patients).
128 See BLAcis LAW DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990). Informed consent is defined as:
a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would
disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a
proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own
welfare and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative
treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.
Id.; see also In re Behringer v. Princeton Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1278 (N.J. Super.
1991) (determining that "medical information or a risk of a medical procedure is material
when a reasonable patient would be likely to attach significance to it in deciding whether or
not to submit to the treatment").
129 See, e.g., Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1280 (noting New Jersey's strong commitment to
filly informed patients as reason to invoke doctrine of informed consent); see also TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.201 (West 1991) (stating that informed consent doctrine
also applies to health care workers). See generally De Barge, supra note 127, at 993 (noting
doctors with HIV pose material risk to patient and informed consent should be required for
physician to disclose HIV-positive status to patients).
130 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.656 (Vernon 1995) (mandating patients who test positive
for HIV-infection disclose that fact to any other health care professional from whom he
seeks health care services); Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding
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Disadvantagesof Mandatory Disclosure

In evaluating the potential risks and liabilities of mandating
full disclosure in the physician-patient relationship, it is necessary to consider the disadvantages to the persons who must disclose their HIV-positive status.1 3 ' Opponents of disclosure argue
that mandatory testing and contact tracing 1 32 would discourage
HIV-infected individuals from cooperating with public officials because of the stigma attached to disclosure. 3 3 Ostracism and discrimination are known consequences of positive HIV status made
public. 1 4 These fears may be allayed, however, because the papatients have duty to inform physician of HIV status); Gostin, supra note 117, at 32 (noting
testing patients for HIV in health care settings with patient's informed consent poses no
legal or ethical difficulties); Oddi, supra note 76, at 1449 (noting HIV-positive patient
should also get informed consent from treating physician because justice is not served
when heath care workers are in unequal position of risk that could be easily avoided); Rogers, supra note 124, at 1 (advocating mutual disclosure of HIV-positive and AIDS status in
physician-patient relationship).
131 See New York State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 77 N.Y.2d 677, 686 (N.Y. 1991)
(recognizing disincentives of disclosure for HIV-infected persons due to discrimination in
variety of areas); Rasmussen v. So. Florida Blood Serv, Inc., 500 So.2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987)
(recognizing AIDS as modern equivalent of leprosy); see also Penn Lerblance, Legal Redress
for DisabilityDiscrimination:Bob, Carol, Ted and Alice EncounterAIDS, 24 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 307, 309 (1994) (noting severe social stigma and discrimination are additional
challenges to physical impairments of AIDS-infected individuals).
132 See New York State Soc'y of Surgeons, 77 N.Y.2d at 685-86 (describing futile effect of
contact tracing for HIV-infected individuals, because of delayed testing due to latent development of symptoms).
13 See Nolley v. Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 734-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding constitutional
violations of inmate who was segregated from the general population, denied access to law
library and church services, and ostracized by policy of placing red stickers on her possessions); Hunter v. Enquirer/Star, Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269 (1st Dep't 1994) (finding meritorious defamation claim existed when defendant portrayed plaintiff as having intimate
contract with HIV-infected individual and imputing to plaintiff "loathsome or communicable disease"); 119-121 East 97th St. Corp. v. New York Comm'n on Human Rts., 642
N.Y.S.2d 638, 640 (1st Dep't 1996) (finding damages award of $100,000 for mental anguish
was supported by evidence of tenant who experienced electricity interruptions, break-ins,
telephone harassment, shouting that he should die painful death, and disclosure to his
employer that he was HIV-positive); Petri v. Bank of N.Y. Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611-12
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding cause of action existed for employee unreasonably discharged
when employer mistakenly perceived him to be HIV-positive); see also New York State Soc'y
of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 77 N.Y.2d at 686 (acknowledging that intravenous drug users would
be less likely to seek treatment and homosexuals would fear discrimination in housing,
health care and employment if their HIV-positive status were to be made public).
134 119-121 East 97th Street Corp., 642 N.Y.S.2d at 640, 644 (affirming conclusion of
administrative law judge that landlord unlawfully discriminated against HIV-positive tenant finding defendant promulgated "agenda of spite, malice and bias, acted upon over an
extended period of time, resulting in the severe emotional and mental abuse of a tenant,
seriously ill with AIDS . . ."); see Bruce Alpert, Gay Adults' Moms Push Bill Ending Job
Bias, TnAEs PICAYUNE, Mar. 21, 1996, at A17. Parents of gay children lobbied for antidiscrimination legislation. Id. One parent stated, "[Pleople can be legally fired in 42 states,
including Louisiana, just for being gay or lesbian." Id; Joyce Purnick, Looking Back At a
Conflict on Gay Rights, N.Y. TImsS, Mar. 21, 1996, at B1. The author notes the passage in
New York of civil rights legislation banning discrimination against homosexuals in areas
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confidential and protected by the phytient's HIV status remains
135
sician-patient privilege.
The goal of mutual protection for both patient and physician,
through full disclosure of HIV status by each party could be
achieved if the legislature models disclosure rules after the principle relied upon in the New Jersey case, In re Quinlan. 36 The
Quinlan court, weighing the issues involved in removing a woman
from life support, considered the competing personal and professional ethics of a treating physician. 1 37 If doctors and patients acted in the best interests of each other rather than for purposes of
self-protection, there would be no need to legislate a solution to
this issue."' Such altruism is rare, however,139 and because the
legislature has remained silent, New140York courts have been forced
to step in and address these issues.
including housing and employment. Id. Discrimination complaints made to the Human
Rights Commission based on sexual orientation have increased over the last six years. Id.
135 See Doe v. Roe, 599 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352-53, 357 (4th Dep't 1993) (noting New York's
strong public policy concern for health of its citizens as reflected in confidentiality protections for HIV and AIDS sufferers found in New York statutory scheme and finding no separate consideration necessary to mandate confidentiality of HIV status in physician-patient
relationship); Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (observing statutory environment prohibits doctors from sharing knowledge of patient's HIV status with other
health care providers); Taub, supra note 73, at 332 (noting AIDS confidentiality statutes
simply reinforce physician's ethical duty to maintain confidentiality as per physician-patient privilege); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2782 (McKinney 1993) (listing rare exceptions
when health-care providers can disclose confidential medical information); Wakefield,
supra note 72, at 557 (stating that physician-patient privilege encompasses both oral testimony by physician and release of patient's treatment records kept by physician or
hospital).
136 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
137 Id. at 668. "[T]here must be a way to free physicians, in the pursuit of their healing
vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or self-protection concerns which
would inhibit their independent medical judgments for the well-being of their... patients."
Id.
138 See Sandra N. Hurd, States Legislate HIV Issues for the Workplace, EMPLOYMENT
TESTiNG-LAw & POL'Y REPORTER, May 1992, at 53 (describing various passed and proposed
legislative initiatives regarding AIDS and HIV); see also Eisenstat, supra note 10, at 340
(assessing governmental interest in mandatory screening); Christina Kent, "Most Litigated
Disease"Impacts Public Health Policy, AMEmUcAN MED. NEWS, Aug. 12, 1996, at 6 (noting
legal system is increasingly settling AIDS related cases of varied issues including insurance, privacy, compensation rights and AIDS education in schools).
139 See Daniels, supra note 125, at 3. The author notes that professionals in the health
care industry have may have a moral if not legal obligation to disclose their HIV-status. Id.
The author suggests that the controversy over mandatory disclosure can be quelled by appealing to this professional obligation of a physician. Id; Brinkley, supra note 93, at 429-30
(noting case of Florida dentist accused of infecting Kimberly Bergalis and four additional
patients with HIV has caused increased public concerns over HIV transmission from health
care workers to patients); Letter from Kathy Roberts to Editor, PEOPLE, Mar. 27, 1995, at 4
(expressing disgust at Greg Louganis for putting himself before others by not disclosing
HIV status to treating physician).
140 See Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 241-42 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (discussing obligation of
patient to disclose HIV-status to physician). See generally Kent, supra note 138, at 6 (stat-
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The Judicial Solution: Patients Do Have A Duty to Disclose

At least one New York court has held that a legal duty exists, by
virtue of the New York Public Health Law, requiring patients
aware of their HIV-positive status to disclose their condition to a
treating physician.' 41 The New York Public Health Law provides
many positive benefits and protections to persons with AIDS,142
but does not insulate HIV or AIDS-infected individuals from
the
143
consequences of infecting others negligently or maliciously.
In Doe v. Roe,14 4 the plaintiff patient brought an action against
his treating physician for revealing his HIV-positive status to the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Worker's Compensation. 145 The Doe
court addressed several interesting questions concerning privacy, 146 holding that the patient has a duty to disclose HIV-positive status to his physician. 147 The court determined that the duty
arises not as a result of the patient having a duty per se to a physician, but rather out of the patient's engaging in behavior which
elevates the risk of transmitting a deadly communicable disease
to an unknowing health care provider, who may further unwiting that over two thousand lawsuits have been commenced since AIDS epidemic began
with courts settling many AIDS-related issues including discrimination, insurance, and
AIDS curriculum in schools).
141 See Doe, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 241 (stating that N.Y.CoMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 10
§ 63.5[j] "does not negate any legal duty on a patient's behalf to disclose a known HIV
infection to the treating doctor").
142 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw art. 27-F § 2780 (McKinney 1993) (mandating silence
from health and social service workers who obtain confidential HIV-related information in
course of business and that disclosure can only occur when compelling need arises).
143 See Doe, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 242. Public health law protecting confidentiality is not a
blanket with which to shield patients negligently or knowingly transmitting HIV. Id; see
also Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (1st Dep't 1986). The plaintiff wife
brought several claims against her husband for transmitting genital herpes to her. Id. at
105. The court held that there is a duty to disclose a communicable illness, and that failure
to do so is equivalent to fraudulent concealment. Id. at 107. The court further held that this
duty to disclose, given the relationship of trust between the parties, can also be predicated
on N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2307, which makes intercourse with knowledge of an infectious
venereal disease a misdemeanor. Id. See generally Richard C. Schoenstein, Note, Standards of Conduct, Multiple Defendants, and Full Recovery of Damages in Tort Liabilityfor
the Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 18 HoFsTRA L. REv. 37, 50 (1989)
(evaluating duty of care owed by HIV-positive persons to others as factor in determining
negligence).
144 588 N.Y.S.2d at 236, affd as modified 599 N.Y.S.2d 350 (4th Dep't 1993).
145 Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 239-40 (Sup. Ct. 1992). Dr. Roe, complying with request by Worker's Compensation Board, forwarded complete copy of patient's medical
records which included, among other things, his HIV-positive status. Id. at 240.
146 Id. at 240. Plaintiffs five claims included negligence per se, breach of confidentiality,
breach of oral contract, breach of implied contract, and invasion of privacy. Id.
147 Id. at 241-42.

1996]

PRIVACY, PRIVILEGE AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW

tingly transmit it to others.1 48 The Doe court aptly described the
ethical and equitable arguments supporting the legal duty for patients to disclose HIV status and mandated disclosure. 14 9 In requiring patient disclosure, the Doe Court acted on an issue unaddressed by the Legislature. 150 It is evident that the judiciary has
been forced to resolve an issue that is better left to the
legislature.' 5 '
E.

New York's Legislative Proposals Consider Mandatory
Disclosure

The controversy over privacy rights has clouded the public policy goals of disclosure. 15 2 The overriding public policy interest
that governs this debate is protection of the public health against
the spread of this deadly disease.153 Several bills addressing this
148 See id. at 242 (analogizing intrusive physical exam to sexual activity and finding that
former poses same risk of HIV transmission to uninformed physician as latter).
149 Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 242 (Sup. Ct. 1992). The court holds that the legal duty
to disclose arises:
out of not only moral and ethical considerations, but out of logic, common sense and
medical evidence as well, with regard to the general health of society and its physician
caretakers. To hold otherwise would be to improvidently elevate policy and the political aspects of this fatal disease over the medically proven health dangers of exposure
to HIV infected blood, semen, saliva, etc., and to demonstrated risks of transmission to
unknowing and unprepared recipients.
Id.
150 Id. at 241 (court imposes absolute duty on patient to disclose any positive knowledge
of HIV infection).
151 Id. at 239 (prefacing holding that patients are responsible to disclose HIV status by
stating that court decided many sensitive issues of first impression with respect to patient's
rights and physician-patient privileges under Public Health Law Article 27-F); see also
Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial,Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MNN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1986) (noting that Constitution
explicitly grants legislative power to Congress and legislative lawmaking is superior to
judicial lawmaking); Major Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From Conciliation to Litigation-How CongressDelegatesLawmaking to the Courts, 141 MIL. L. REv. 1,
7-8 (1993) (noting that 1991 Civil Rights Act failed to define terms and goals in its amendments, thereby delegating Congress' authority to shape law to courts who ignore Congress'
intention); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV.
263, 264, 266-67 (1992) (stating that notion of lawmaking by federal judges runs contrary
to principles on which U.S. was founded, and justice is better served when clear lines of
authority are heeded).
152 See Goode, supra note 8, at 970 (acknowledging public policy must address balancing
act between privacy rights of AIDS patients with rights of society to be informed); Turkington, supra note 7, at 875 (noting positive values of preserving integrity of physicianpatient relationship and maintaining confidentiality of patient data collides with public
policy goals of government in preserving public safety and saving lives); cf. Eisenstat, supra
note 10, at 327 (arguing mandatory testing does not comport with sound public health
policy).
153 Doe v. Roe, 599 N.Y.S.2d 350,352-53 (4th Dep't 1993) (describing New York's strong
public policy concerns as indicated by legislative intent of enacting Article 27-F guarantee-
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issue have been introduced in the New York legislature.'5 Assembly Bill 377155 seeks to modify section 2130 of the Public Health
Law by limiting the full confidentiality blanket currently provided
by the statute. 156 The proposed bill would require the reporting of
an HIV or AIDS diagnosis to the Health Commissioner of the municipality where the illness occurred. 157 Additionally, proposed
section 2134 would permit a physician or law enforcement officer
to report to the Health Commissioner a suspected case of HIV or
AIDS if the potentially infected individual acts without regard for
158
the health and safety of the public.

These bills, however, do not appear to encourage or mandate
disclosure.' 5 9 Assembly Bill 4516,160 introduced in February of
1995, appears to be the most comprehensive change to the Public
Health Law in the area of mandatory disclosure.161 The bill would
amend the confidentiality and disclosure section of the Public
16 3
Health Law 1 6 2 to mandate New York health care professionals

who know they have AIDS, an HIV infection, HIV-related illness
ing confidentiality rights); Roth v. New York Blood Ctr., 596 N.Y.S.2d 639, 646 (Sup. Ct.

1993) (stating '[this public policy of nondisclosure has been repeatedly upheld...").
154 See e.g., N.Y.A. 4516, 219th Sess. (1996) (prohibiting HIV or AIDs-infected healthcare professionals from performing procedures that risk infection transmission to patient
absent prior consent); N.Y.A. 1363, 219th Sess. (1996) (prescribing discovery procedures for
police and other uniformed officers to be notified of potential exposure to AIDS); N.Y.A.
5900, 218th Sess. (1995) (authorizing AIDS test for prison inmates requesting marital privileges); N.Y.A. 2049, 218th Sess. (1995) (providing for HIV testing of sex offenders with
disclosure to victims of results); N.Y.S. 1596, 218th Sess. (1995) (granting authority to
Health Commissioner to require blood test for AIDS virus prior to issuing marriage license); N.Y.A. 1349, 218th Sess. (1995) (authorizing courts, upon application, to order HIV
testing of person causing exposure to others in risk occupation).
155 N.Y.A. 377, 218th Sess. (1995) (recommitted to Assembly committee on health on 1/3/
96).
,156 See id. (requiring reporting cases of HIV infection to Health Commissioner and contact tracking of HIV-infected persons who pose imminent danger to public).
157 See id. § 2130 (mandating duty to report by physicians and other diagnosticians who
become aware of HIV or AIDS infection during medical diagnosis).
158 See id. The proposed amendment to Section 2134 defines someone as acting without
regard to the public welfare if they could potentially transmit or have transmitted the virus
to another person. Id.
159 See supra note 154 (describing bills).
160 N.Y.A. 4516, 218th Sess. (1995) (recommitted to Assembly Committee on Health 1/3/
96).
161 See id. § 2782-A(3). This bill, if passed would prohibit HIV-positive health care professionals from engaging in any invasive procedures which entail an identifiable risk of
transmitting the infection to a patient, and restricts these professionals to activities which
pose no identifiable risk to any patient. Id.
162 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2782 (McKinney 1993) (governing confidentiality of
HIV-related information gained during course of medical or social services with exceptions
for disclosure listed).
163 See id. § 2782-A(1)(a). The bill defines "health care professional" as a "physician, dentist, optometrist, nurse, lab technician, anesthetist, emergency medical personnel, dental
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or a positive164HIV-related test to refrain from performing invasive
procedures.

This bill differs in a significant way from a comparable bill introduced just two years earlier. 165 In 1993, New York State Senate Bill 88166 similarly proposed to modify the confidentiality and
disclosure section of the Public Health Law by mandating disclosure by HIV-infected health-care professionals and requiring the
informed consent of a patient in order to perform an invasive procedure. 167 More importantly, New York State Senate Bill 88168
compelled patients to disclose their HIV-positive status to a physician or dentist before an invasive procedure is performed upon
them. 1 69 This section of the amendment is noticeably1 70absent,
however, from the currently proposed version of the bill.
The legislature, continually addressing the issue of disclosure in
the physician-patient relationship for the last five years, 171 seems
hygienist or other health care professional who has physical contact with patients during
the course of their professional activities." Id.
164 See id. § 2782-A(3). The bill states:
"any health care professional who has tested positive, or who has been diagnosed as
having HIV infection, AIDS, or HIV-related illness shall abstain from performing invasive procedures which pose an identifiable risk of transmission and shall restrict his or
her normal professional activities to those activities that pose no identifiable risk to
any patient, unless prior to performing an invasive medical procedure, the HIV-infected health care professional discloses his or her sero-positive status and proceeds
only [with] written informed consent."
Id.
165 See N.Y.S. 88, 215th Sess. (1993) (requiring disclosure by physicians with informed
consent to perform procedures, and disclosure by patients to physicians).
166 See N.Y.S. 88, 215th Sess. (1993) (amending N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 by adding
§ 2782-A governing mandatory disclosure in health-care professional/patient relationship).
167 See id. § 2782-A(1) and § 2782-A(2) (defining "invasive procedures" and commanding
physicians and dentists licensed in New York and performing invasive procedure to disclose any knowledge of existing HIV infection or positive H1V test results).
168 See N.Y.S. 88, 215th Sess. (1993).
169 See id. § 2782-A(3). This section proposed that "every person having AIDS, an HIV
infection, an HIV related illness or a positive HIV related test shall have the duty to disclose the presence of such disease or of such positive test to any dentist or physician who
will perform an invasive procedure upon such patient." Id; cf. N.Y.A. 4178, 215th Sess.
(1993). The Assembly version of the bill, introduced on February 25, 1993 shortly after the
Senate version, only prescribed disclosure by the physician and omitted any mention of
patient disclosure. Id. § 2782-A(3).
170 Compare N.Y.S. 88, 215th Sess. (1993) (mandating health-care professionals and patients have mutual obligation to disclose known positive HIV status), with N.Y.A. 4516,
218th Sess. (1995) (compelling disclosure of HIV status only by health-care professional
with no mention of patient's duty).
171 See e.g., N.YA. 4516, 218th Sess. (1995) (introduced on February 27, 1995, and recommitted to Health Committee on January 3, 1996 mandating disclosure only from
health-care professional to patient); N.Y.S. 88, 215th Sess. (1993) (introduced on January
6, 1993, similarly compelling mutual disclosure prior to invasive procedure); N.Y.S. 4732,
214th Sess. (1991) (introduced on April 15, 1991, and mandating that physicians, dentists
and patients disclose whether they have HIV or AIDS before an invasive procedure).
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to be aware of the potential risks of transmission and benefits of
disclosure. By failing to include patient disclosure in the most recently proposed version, the legislature appears to have made a
deliberate choice to relieve patients of the duty to disclose HIV
status found by the court in Doe v. Roe.' v2 The Doe court even recognized that it, rather than the
legislature, was setting health
73
care policy in New York State.
III.

QUESTIONS OF PRIVACY AND THE NEW YORK

"AIDS

BABY" BILL

The debate over the "AIDS Baby" Bill, a modified version of
which was enacted by the New York Legislature in June, 1996, is
another matter requiring balancing between the state's interests
in preserving the public health and safety, and the privacy of an
individual. The AIDS tragedy takes on a new and chilling meaning when babies are born infected with the HIV virus.1 74 New
York tests every newborn child for HIV infection. 75 Until June,
1996, this information was used only for statistical purposes, and
172 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 241-42 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (finding patient's duty to disclose HIV-infection to treating physician to avoid negligently or fraudulently transmitting disease).
173 Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 239. The court stated, "Many various and sensitive issues
of first impression have necessarily been decided by this Court with respect to the patient's
rights and remedies under... Public Health Law Article 27-F." Id; see also Davis, supra
note 151, at 1, 3 (noting that judicial lawmaking is inferior to legislative lawmaking and
large volume of cases appealed highlights uncertainty of judge-made law); Arthur D.
Hellman, Error Correction,Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court'sExercise of Discretionary
Review, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 795, 796 (1983) (stating that lawmaking by courts occurs when
cases cannot be resolved by applying existing rules).
174 See Karen L. Goldstein, Note, Balancing Risks and Rights: HIV Testing Regimes for
Pregnant Women, 4 CORNELL J.L. AND PuB. POL. 609, 612 (1994) (stating that "between
fifteen to forty percent of infants born to HIV-positive mothers ultimately become infected"); Linda Farber Post, Note, Unblinded MandatoryH1V Screening of Newborns: Care
or Coercion?, 16 CARDozo L. REv. 169, 169 (1994-95) (explaining how increase of AIDS
cases in children coupled with "elusiveness of a cure have prompted the search for alternative methods of prevention, treatment, and control").
175 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTu LAW § 2500-f (McKinney 1996) (requiring all infants to be

tested for HIV); GERALD J. STINE, ACQUIRED ImuNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME: BIOLOGICAL,
MEDICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL IssuEs 113, 317 (1993). New York began newborn blind-test-

ing for HIV in 1987. Id. New York is not the only state that permits non-consent testing of
infants. Id; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148 (1995) (permitting testing without consent
by parent on child suspected to have AIDS); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-6-12 - 14(a) (1995) (permitting health care provider to conduct HIV test without consent on patient younger than
one year of age). See generally Keith Henry et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody Testing: A Descriptionof Practices and Policies at U.S. Infectious Disease-Teaching
Hospitals and Minnesota Hospitals, 259 JAMA 1819 (1988) (commenting many hospitals
engage in blind AIDS testing without obtaining consent from patient).
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neither the child nor the treating physician ever learned the
176
results.
The New York legislature attempted to remedy this situation
through Public Health Law § 2500-f, a form of Assembly Bill No.
6684, commonly known as the "AIDS Baby" bill. 1 77 Public Health
Law § 2500-f presently allows the limited disclosure of the infant's
HIV status upon the decision of the State Health Commissioner. 1 78 This is a weak compromise when the original bill
sought to automatically disclose positive HIV results to the
treating physician who could immediately treat the child's
HIV infection. 179 This grave difference between the passed law

176 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2781 (McKinney 1996) (requiring individual's consent
prior to HIV testing). Presently, infants are automatically tested for HIV upon birth, so
consent is not currently required. Id.; N.Y. PUB. HELTH LAw § 2500-a (requiring
mandatory HIV test for all newborn infants); see also Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of HIV-Blood Test Results to the Individual Tested: A Matter of Personal Choice Neglected, 22 Loy. U. Cm. L. J. 445, 447-48 (1991) (discussing mandatory testing and right
not to be informed of results).
177 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2500-f (McKinney 1996); N.Y.A. 6684, 218th Sess.
(1995) (hereinafter "AIDS Baby" Bill).
178 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2500-f(McKinney 1996). The enacted version of§ 2500-f
reads:
Human Immunodeficiency Virus; testing of newborns
1. In order to improve the health outcomes of newborns, and to improve access to care
and treatment for newborns infected with or exposed to human immunodeficiency virs (HIV) and their mothers, the commissioner shall establish a comprehensive program for the testing of newborns for the presence of [HIV] and/or the presence of antibodies to such virus.
2. The commissioner shall promulgate regulations governing the implementation of
the program required pursuant to subdivision one of this section, including the administration of testing, counseling, tracking, disclosure of test results pursuant to section
twenty-seven hundred eighty-two of this chapter, follow-up reviews, and educational
activities relating to such testing.
Id.
179 Compare N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2500-f (McKinney 1996) (legislating right to test
newborns and to release results subject to State Health Commissioner's approval and regulations), with N.Y.A. 6684-B, 218th Sess. (1995) (proposing additional section to § 2500-a of
Public Health Law requiring that physicians refer HIV-positive infants to HIV-related
services within reasonable time after receipt of positive test results), and N.Y.A. 6684-A,
218th Sess. (1995) (proposing amendment to AIDS confidentiality statute permitting notification to baby's mother of HIV test results of infant). The language of Assembly Bills 6684A and 6684-B is much stronger than the actual passed legislation of N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw
§ 2500-f. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2500-f (McKinney 1996). The undeniable benefit to
HIV-infected newborns of immediate medical care has been weighed against the overriding
confidentiality concerns of disclosure; see, e.g., AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION
29-31 (Ruth R. Faden et al. eds., 1991) (discussing improving AIDS medical care for women); Goldstein, supra note 174, at 612 (discussing impact of drug AZT on pregnant HIVpositive women); Post, supra note 174, at 170-78 (discussing benefits of early care in HIVpositive babies).

ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

838

[Vol. 11:805

and the original bill has been the source of a firestorm of debate. 180
In the original "AIDS Baby" Bill, the mother's right to privacy,
statutorily protected by New York's AIDS Confidentiality law, 8 1
was juxtaposed against the state interest in protecting the health
of the infant and the public at large.18 2 This balancing caused intense debate over privacy rights implicated in the "AIDS Baby"
Bill.'8

3

This debate was complicated by the fear that mandatory

risk for HIV-infection
testing could discourage women at 8 high
4
from seeking prenatal medical care.'
At the heart of the problem lies the question of the mother's
right to privacy. Testing for AIDS is a form of search and seizure,
which is prohibited by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 8 5 It is
180 Compare Test All Newborns ForAIDS, NEWSDAY, Apr. 21, 1991, at 31 (arguing for
disclosure of infant's HIV-status), with Catherine A. Lynch, Don't Test Newborns for AIDS,

NEWSDAY, May 19, 1991, at 43 (arguing against disclosure as violative of confidentiality of
mothers HIV-status). See generally infra notes 182-184 (discussing fierce debate between
proponents for rights of infected infant and advocates of general right to privacy of mother).
181 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2782 (McKinney 1996).
182 See, e.g., Test all Newborns ForAIDS, supra note 180, at 31 (asserting that baby's
health outweighs mother's right to privacy). But see Lynch, supra note 180, at 43 (arguing
that "[mlandatory testing of newborns for HIV will not address the real problem faced by
HIV-infected children and their... mothers: lack of access to health care"). See generally
Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Non-Anonymous Testing of Newborns for HIV: Should it
Ever Be Allowed?, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 373, 374 (1994) (discussing pros and cons of
"AIDS Baby" Bill proposal); Leonardo Renna, Note, New York State's Proposalto Unblind
HIV Testing ForNewborns: A Necessary Step in Addressing a CriticalProblem, 60 BROOK
L. REv. 407, 410 (1994) (supporting "AIDS Baby" Bill and HIV-disclosure).
183 See Richard Goldstein, Spare the Mother, Save the Child, VILLAGE VOICE, June 7,
1994, at 24 (discussing debate over rights of mother versus rights of child); Peter Hellman,
Should It Be A Crime to Treat This Baby for AIDS?, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 21, 1994, at 25 (debating whether mother's rights outweigh infant's rights); John Riley, Focus on: Mandatory
AIDS Tests Painof Knowing Doctor, ClinicianDisagreeon Testing Moms, Newborns, Newsday, July 25, 1993, at 15 (discussing doctor's dilemma over non-disclosure of HIV status).
184 See Jeffrey L. Reynolds, Keep Policy on Newborns' HIV Test, NEwSDAY, Feb. 7, 1994,
at D5 (opining test will drive mothers farther from health care services); see also Gina
Kolata, Discovery That AIDS Can Be Prevented in Babies Raises Debate on Mandatory
Testing, N.Y. TImsS, Nov. 3, 1994, at B14 (illustrating how scientific proof that AZT will
help newborn fight HIV infection if administered before birth or immediately afterwards
will help push AIDS Baby Bill through Legislature); Mireya Navarro, AIDS Panel Urges
Tests for More Women, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 25, 1994, at B4 (illustrating use of AZT during
pregnancy prevents spread of infection to infant); AIDS Babies: O.K., Now Prove It, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 11, 1994, at A14 (challenging New York Legislature to 'put their money where
their mouth is' and pass bill). But see Debra Cooper, Myths Won't Save Babies' Lives, NEwsDAY, June 28, 1994, at A28 (claiming identification of HIV- infection will not necessarily
help newborns, but that bill would unduly damage mothers' rights); cf Kyle Hughes, AIDS
Babies Bill Advances, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, June 15, 1995, at 1995 WL 2899322 (reporting AIDS Baby Bill passes N.Y. Senate); Kevin Sack, Compromise Is Proposedon HIV Test,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1995, at B1 (reporting Speaker Sheldon Silver blocks AIDS Baby Bill
in Assembly).
18 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (holding plaintiff's Fourth
and Fifth amendment rights violated); see also Will, supra note 21, at 972 (explaining roots
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an invasive medical procedure that usually requires consent
before it can be performed. 1 86 In addition, New York has specific
confidentiality statutes in place to prevent the spread of test results regarding the patient's AIDS status.-8 7 In the case of AIDS
babies, however, there is a legitimate state interest served in disand transmission preclosing HIV results - babies can be treated
8
implemented.'1
be
can
controls
vention
An additional interest is implicated at this juncture, because assessing the health of an innocent newborn implicates the mother's
privacy rights. In Roe and Casey, the Court's rationale considered
the state's interest in regulating abortions differently during each
part of the pregnancy. 189 Roe dictates that the right to an abortion
is not absolute' 90 , and there is a compelling state interest to protect the life of the unborn child from the point of viability until
birth.' 9 ' The state interest espoused in the "AIDS Baby" Bill, and
attempted in Public Health Law § 2500-f, is to affirmatively protect the child already born HIV-positive and living without sup-

of right to privacy springing from Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 617-18 (1886) (holding plaintiff was victim of illegal search and seizure which
violated his individual rights under Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
186 See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914) (discussing
patient's right to give consent before invasive medical testing); Renna, supra note 182, at
420-21 (discussing same right in AIDS baby context).
187 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2781-2782 (McKinney 1996) (AIDS confidentiality
statute). Section 2781 was recently amended to allow for disclosure in cases specified under
the new § 2500-f. Id. § 2781(6)(d) (holding confidentiality provisions of section do not apply
to § 2500-f0; see also 220 N.Y.A. 4413-C (1996) (enacted form of "AIDS Baby Bill" which
added § 2500-f to N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw and amended subdivision 6 of section 2781); see
also supra note 69 (listing other states with AIDS confidentiality statutes).
188 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (holding state's interest in protecting viable fetus outweiged woman's unlimited right to choose abortion);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (holding state's interest in fighting against prevelant spread of prescription drug abuse outweighed individual's right to privately take such
prescription drugs); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-27 (1905) (holding state's
interest in protecting society from epidemic of smallpox outweighed individual's objections
to vaccinations).
189 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (stating state's interest in
protecting fetus outweighs mother's right to abort upon viability of fetus); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (stating state's interest outweighs mother's right to abort in third
trimester).
190 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (stating right to abortion is not absolute).
191 See id. (noting state interest in protecting viable fetus).
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port of the womb. 192 Certainly this interest can be no less compel93
ling than the interests preserved in Casey.1
Section 2500-f falls short by not mandating parental notification. 194 This timid law seems to be a half-measure' 95 that does not
even address, let alone resolve, the problem of properly balancing
the mother's right to privacy against the infant's right to a healthy
life. 196 This new law still neglects the interest of the one individ192 See New York AIDS Advisory Council, Report of the Subcommittee on Newborn
Screening, 2-4 (1994) (discussing pros and cons of passing AIDS Baby Bill); 1996 SESS. LAW
NEWS OF N.Y. ExEc. MEMO Ch. 220 (June 1996) (statement by Gov. Pataki on intent of

§ 2500-f, explaining importance of early detection of HIV in infants); see also Holly Taylor,
State Expected to Reveal HIV Data, TIEms UNION (Albany), Jan. 20, 1996, at Al (anticipating adoption of Pataki's regulation on Febuary 1, 1996, which would permit mothers to
discover results of test upon inquiry). "Passage of the regulation, however, won't end the
controversy over the state's anonymous testing of newborns for HIV." Id.; see also Dena
Bunis & Michael Slackman, New Rule on AIDS Tests on Babies, NEWSDAY (New York), Oct.
10, 1995; at A13 (discussing regulations); James Dao, Mothers to Get AIDS Test Data
Under Accord N.Y. TmdES, October 10, 1995, at Al (describing settlement which created
this regulation); Nettie Mayersohn, Moms, Babies and HIV, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 1,
1995, at A25 (Assembly sponsor of "AIDS Baby" Bill speaks out against compromise, promotes bill and importance of protecting infants); Manuel Perez-Rivas, Focus on: The AIDS
Baby Bill On a CrusadeLawmaker's Profile Grows, NEWSDAY (New York), Mar. 31, 1994, at
A15 (interviewing Nettie Mayersohn on "AIDS Baby" Bill).
193 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860 (restricting right to choose abortion to pre-viability of
fetus); see also Goldstein, supranote 174, at J.C. (discussing additional limits on individual
rights after Casey); Judges, supra note 59, at 1432 (discussing limitations imposed by
Casey); Pacer, supra note 58, at 303 (describing reevaluation of extent of right of privace
after Casey).
194 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f(2) (McKinney 1996) (allowing disclosure only

through approval of State Health Commissioner); Holly Taylor, State Expected to Reveal
HIV Data, TIMES UNION (Albany), Jan. 20, 1996, at Al (anticipating adoption of Pataki's
regulation on February 1, 1996, which would permit mothers to discover results of test
upon inquiry). "Passage of the regulation, however, won't end the controversy over the
state's anonymous testing of newborns for HIV." Id.; see also Dena Bunis & Michael
Slackman, New Rule on AIDS Tests on Babies, NEWSDAY (New York), Oct. 10, 1995, at A13

(discussing regulations); James Dao, Mothers to Get AIDS Test Data Under Accord, N.Y.
TImEs, Oct. 10, 1995, at Al (describing settlement which created this regulation); Nettie
Mayersohn, Moms, Babies and HIV, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 1, 1995, at A25 (Assembly
sponsor of "AIDS Baby" Bill speaks out against compromise, promotes bill and importance
of protecting infants).
195 In fact, the groups that had been at loggerheads over the AIDS Baby Bill are now all
claiming victory over the passage of Section 2500-f. See Nat Hentoff, The New Tuskegee
Experiment: Infected Has a Right to be Told- No Matter What the ACLU Says, VILLAGE
VOICE, Oct. 1, 1996, at 8 (illustrating different conflicts between ACLU, NOW, Gay Men's
AIDS Crisis Center, and original bill sponsor Assemblywoman Mayersohn never resolved);
Tom Precious, Mothers to Learn if Infants Have H!V, TIMEs UNION (Albany), June 6, 1996,
at Al (reporting Mayersohn, proponent of bill, and Assemblyman Silver, opponent of bill,
claiming § 2500-f victory for each); Holly Taylor, Pataki Announces 2 Programs to Cope
with AIDS, TIMEs UNION (Albany), June 27, 1996, at A7 (reporting Pataki claiming victory
over blinded AIDS testing problems in past, but Mayersohn complaining law is small step
in avoiding "medical abuse in its cruelest form").
196 See Cumin, supra note 90, at 858-60 (examining debate over "AIDS Baby" Bill); Post,
supra note 174, at 170-74 (discussing ongoing controversy in New York over "AIDS Baby"
Bill). See generally Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers,99 HARv. L. REV.
1274, 1274-76 (1986) (discussing rights of confidentiality of AIDS carriers).
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ual who cannot speak for herself - the infant. It seems what
works smoothly politically will circumvent a moral standard.
CONCLUSION

The .optimal resolution of the schism between disclosure and
privacy would require an environment where HIV-infected people
felt safe enough from the stigma of AIDS to disclose their illness to
the health care workers who treat them. This is necessary for the
health and safety of those workers, and in some instances, the
health of themselves and their infants. What is clear, however, is
that the New York Legislature should not continue to avoid this
issue. The legislature has succumbed to quick and easy political
compromises, and as a result, the courts must resolve the practical human issues.
In an imperfect world, citizens may not be motivated by respect
and concern for others. It appears statutory regulation is necessary to force altruism and require that citizens conform with recommended precautions in order to stem the spread of HIVinfection.
The overriding state concern of preserving public health and
welfare should take precedence over the right of all individuals to
withhold knowledge of HIV-infection. Otherwise, the well-intended right to privacy, which protects individual citizens, may
eventually collapse the society that created it.
Grace Kathleen Hogan & Nicole Wertz

